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ABSTRACT 
In 2014, the Islamic State (IS) captured the world’s attention with the declaration 
of the Caliphate. IS showed significant success in exploiting the social media landscape 
to deliver costly signals that advanced its outbidding, intimidation, and polarization 
strategies. This thesis explored the nature of the content produced by IS from 2013 to 
2018 and explained its primary purposes. Specifically, IS exploited social 
media platforms to intimidate internal opposition to its ascendancy and dissuade 
Western countries from intervening against its self-declared state. IS also has 
portrayed itself through social media as both an uncompromising militant movement 
and an effective rebel government in order to outbid rival rebel groups, especially 
those affiliated with al Qaeda. Its extremist violence has a dual purpose. Inside its 
territories, it seeks to polarize Muslims into clear categories of Sunni in-groups and 
Shiite out-groups; outside of its territories, it seeks to polarize the world into Muslim 
in-groups against non-Muslim out-groups. Therefore, despite its fanatical aura, IS 
deploys violence strategically to achieve recruitment and deterrence goals. Apart from 
these strategies, this thesis describes the nature of the social media technology used 
by IS media operators and the ways they sought to circumvent restrictions on social 
media. There are clear patterns of exploiting social media based on tested models 
of social media campaigns that advance its objectives. 
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A. TERRORISM AND COSTLY SIGNALING THEORY 
Strategic use of violence by terrorist groups to achieve some of their goals is not 
new.1 While most scholars acknowledge violence is often used to achieve goals, the 
scholarly literature considers these actions to be primarily symbolic and not strategic.2 In 
the case of terrorists, violence is a form of signal to advance some of the strategies they 
adopt.3 With this signal, the terrorists want to send the message that they do not limit 
themselves to words but are willing and able to do anything to achieve their goals. The 
theory of costly signaling began with the observation of animal behavior and was later 
adapted to explain some of the behaviors of individuals within human society. According 
to this theory, “animals (including humans) may send honest signals about desirable 
personal characteristics and access to resources through costly biological displays, 
altruism, or other behaviors that would be hard to fake.”4 
The adoption of costly signaling by terrorists is not a modern phenomenon. 
During the Roman occupation of Palestine, Jewish zealots, known as Sicarii, used to kill 
their compatriots who were supporters of the Romans in public. In order to make their 
message as clear as possible, the Sicarii carried out the killings in public places, such as 
squares, so that there were enough eyewitnesses to spread the message.5 As Andrew H. 
 
1 Mia M. Bloom, “Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share, and Outbidding,” 
Political Science Quarterly, 119, no. 1 (2004): 64, https://doi.org/10.2307/20202305; Andrew H. Kydd and 
Barbara F. Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” The MIT Press, International Security, 31, no. 1 (2006): 
49–50, https://www.jstor.org/stable/4137539?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents. 
2 Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence, 4th ed. 
(California: UC Press, 2017), 154. 
3 Kydd and Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” 50. 
4 Francis T. McAndrew, “Costly Signaling Theory,” in Encyclopedia of Evolutionary Psychological 
Science, ed. Todd K. Shackelford and Viviana A. Weekes-Shackelford (Cham, Switzerland: Springer 
International Publishing, 2018), 1, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-16999-6_3483-1. 
5 Emerson T. Brooking and P.W. Singer, “War Goes Viral,” The Atlantic, October 11, 2016, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/11/war-goes-viral/501125/. 
2 
Kydd and Barbara F. Walter argue, “terrorist violence is a form of costly signaling.”6 The 
publicity of extremist acts, such as the beheading of prisoners, is a form of “costly 
signaling” or “strategic provocation.”7 The commission of such acts is intended to 
influence the beliefs of people across the spectrum that the extremists are confronting. 
That is, those who commit the acts try to influence the beliefs of their enemies, their 
allies, their supporters, and the neutral people of their territory in ways that help their 
own purpose. Terrorists groups emit costly signals for several reasons. Some of these acts 
are intended to attract new fighters, either local or foreign,8 to show the group’s hierarchy 
the commitment of the actors,9 and to cover up any foreign agents who have infiltrated 
the group; 10 and to pressure its followers to prove their allegiance to the terrorist group 
and its purpose.11  
For the application of the aforementioned theory to achieve successful results, it 
must meet the following conditions concerning the signal and the signaler. The 
relationship between these two terms is that the signaler emits a signal in order to 
influence the receiver.12 So, first, the signal must be clear and understandable to others. 
Moreover, it must be able to attract larger audiences. Second, it must be costly for the 
signaler in energy, power, or some other relevant area. Third, the signal must reliably 
reveal some of the characteristics of the signaler, such as dedication, strength, ability, 
 
6 Kydd and Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” 50. 
7 Simone Molin Friis, “‘Beyond Anything We Have Ever Seen’: Beheading Videos and the Visibility 
of Violence in the War against ISIS,” The Royal Institute of International Affairs 91, no. 4 (2015): 729, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12341. 
8 Barbara F. Walter, “The Extremist’s Advantage in Civil Wars,” The MIT Press, International 
Security 42, no. 2 (2017): 9, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00292. 
9 Walter, 11. 
10 Scott Gates and Sukanya Podder, “Social Media, Recruitment, Allegiance and the Islamic State,” 
Perspectives on Terrorism 9, no. 4 (2015): 110–11, 
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/446. 
11 Thomas Hegghammer, “The Recruiter’s Dilemma: Signaling and Rebel Recruitment Tactics,” 
SAGE, Journal of Peace Research 50, no. 1 (2012): 12, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343312452287. 
12 Diego Gambetta and Michael Bacharach, “Trust in Signs,” in Trust in Society, vol. II, The Russell 
Sage Foundation Series on Trust (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2001), 159, 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/209409853. 
3 
risk-taking, and leadership. The last condition is that the application of such behavior 
should bring some significant benefits to the signaler.13 Finally, as Diego Gambetta 
mentions, signals are not just “cues, marks and symbolic signs.”14 Signals are thus 
different from “cheap talk” that is less credible to the audience. For example, for 
jihadists, a battle wound from Afghanistan or Iraq would be a more reliable sign than 
would be a verbal statement praising the Islamic State (IS).15 
Terrorist groups have made extensive use of media and sophisticated propaganda 
to achieve these conditions detailed by costly signaling theory. Media, in all its forms, 
plays a decisive role in modern society. The information and images projected by the 
media on citizens, as well as the interaction between the media and the public, are what 
shape society’s perception of social reality.16 The terrorist groups have long realized this 
power of the media, and they tried in every way to strengthen their impact on various 
types of media. As Osama Bin Laden mentioned “[i]t is obvious that the media war in 
this century is one of the strongest methods; in fact its ratio may reach 90% of the total 
preparation for the battle.”17 Similarly, former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher 
argued that the publicity is the oxygen of terrorism, and terrorists at all times have 
understood this and acted accordingly.18 
 
13 Eric Alden Smith and Rebecca L.Bliege Bird, “Turtle Hunting and Tombstone Opening: Public 
Generosity as Costly Signaling.,” Evolution and Human Behaviour 21 (2000): 245–47. 
14 Diego Gambetta, “Deceptive Mimicry in Humans,” in Perspectives on Imitation: From 
Neuroscience to Social Science, vol. 2 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 231–32, 
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ebook-nps/detail.action?docID=3338568. 
15 The Islamic State (IS - also known as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, ISIS/ ISIL or Daesh) in 
Craig Whiteside, “Lying to Win: The Islamic State Media Department’s Role in Deception Efforts,” The 
RUSI Journal, 165, no. 1 (March 9, 2020): 130−141 https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2020.1734318. 
16 Brian A. Monahan, The Shock of the News: Media Coverage and the Making of 9/11 (New York: 
New York University Press, 2010), 30. 
17 Brigitte L. Nacos, Terrorism and Counterrorism, 5th ed. (New York: Routledge, 2016), 356. 
18 Nacos, 357. 
4 
B. MEDIA DYNAMICS AND THE ADVENT OF THE INTERNET 
Media dynamics have skyrocketed with the advent of the Internet, and every new 
technological breakthrough on the Internet has further enhanced this dynamic. Modern 
terrorists quickly moved to the Internet and began to explore it to their advantage. In 
2005, the leader of al Qaeda (AQ), Ayman al Zawahiri, stated that “we are in a battle and 
more than half of this battle is in the media. In this media battle we are in the race for the 
hearts and minds of our Umma.”19 Al-Shabaab and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
(AQAP), al Qaeda affiliates, quickly followed in the footsteps of their parent 
organization. In fact, the leader of al-Shabab Omar Hammami once stated emphatically 
that “[t]he war of narratives has become even more important than the war of navies, 
napalm, and knives.”20 Terrorists have been using the Internet for a long time, and it has 
become their favorite tool. Raphael Cohen-Almagor mentions that, according to the U.S. 
Department of State Bureau of Counterterrorism in 2014, the number of online sites 
operated by terrorist groups had increased from 12 in 1998 to more than 4,800 in 2010.21 
The Internet is decentralized, allowing access to anyone who wants it, and at the 
same time, it offers the user anonymity, protecting him or her from possible controls or 
restrictions.22 For this reason, all terrorist groups now have their own pages on the 
Internet, and through them, the groups promote their propaganda, recruit new members, 
and gain funding.23 In planning, organizing, and coordinating terrorist attacks, terrorists 
 
19 Christina Schori Liang, Cyber Jihad: Understanding and Countering Islamic State Propaganda, 
GCSP Policy Paper (Geneva, Switzerland: Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2015), 2, 
https://www.jugendundmedien.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/3_Medienkompetenz/Gegennarrative/Cyber_Jiha
d_-_Understanding_and_Countering_Islamic_State_Propaganda.pdf. 
20 Simon Cottee, “Why It’s So Hard to Stop ISIS Propaganda,” The Atlantic, March 2, 2015, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/03/why-its-so-hard-to-stop-isis-
propaganda/386216/. 
21 Raphael Cohen - Almagor, Confronting the Internet’s Dark Site: Moral and Social Responsibility 
on the Free Highway, 1st ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 179. 
22 Leevia Dillon, “Cyberterrorism: Using the Internet as a Weapon of Destruction,” in Combating 
Violent Extremism and Radicalization in the Digital Era, Advances in Religious and Cultural Studies 
(Hershey, PA: Information Science Reference, 2016), 429–30. 
23 Gabriel Weimann, Terrorism in Cyberspace: The Next Generation, 1st ed. (Washington, D.C., New 
York: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Columbia University Press, 2015), 18. 
5 
have leveraged these features of the Internet, which has boosted the whole process by 
making everything more straightforward, and at a lower cost to the group, without 
compromising the level of security and secrecy of the older methods used by terrorists.24 
As Gabriel Weimann argues “the Internet is in many ways an ideal arena for terrorist and 
other extremist group activities. The great virtues of the Internet⎯its ease of access, lack 
of regulation, vast potential audiences, fast flow of information and so forth⎯have 
converted into the advantages of groups committed to terrorizing societies to achieve 
their goals. [Moreover], the anonymity offered by Internet is very attractive for modern 
terrorists.”25 
The evolution of the World Wide Web to Web 2.0 has led to the creation of social 
media and the interaction of users with each other. Along with the web upgrade came 
smartphones that gave the user a choice to use the Internet and its applications from his or 
her mobile phone. For example, P. W. Singer and Emerson T. Brooking cite the existence 
of smartphones as one of the factors that made IS more effective than previous terrorist 
groups.26 These two developments have boosted the use of mobile phones and social 
media to new heights, even in the poorest parts of the world. In 2018, the Pew Research 
Center surveyed 19 emerging and developing countries on the access their citizens have 
to the Internet, whether they own smartphones, and whether they use social media. For 
the period between 2013 to 2018, the percentage of citizens who had smartphones 
increased from 24% to 42% and the use of social media from 34% to 53%, 
respectively.27 Social networks, in particular, dominated all aspects of users’ social life, 
gaining enormous momentum. The term social media refers to the means of interacting 
 
24 Weimann, 19. 
25 Weimann, 21. 
26 P.W. Singer and Emerson T. Brooking, Like War: The Weaponization of Social Media, 1st ed. 
(New York: First Mariner Books, 2019), 150. 
27 Jacob Poushter, Caldwell Bishop, and Hanyu Chwe, “Social Media Use Continues To Rise in 






and communicating with groups of people through online communities. Social media 
appears in many forms and is the social interaction between people who create, share, or 
exchange information and ideas across virtual communities and networks. Nowadays, 
“[e]very minute, Facebook users post 500,000 new comments, 239,000 new statuses, and 
45,000 new photos; YouTube users, more than 500 hours of video; and Twitter users, 
more than 350,000 tweets.”28 
The impact of social media on users is multifaceted. First, according to Dr. Jim 
Taylor in Psychology Today, “the goal for many now in their use of social media 
becomes how they can curry acceptance, popularity, status, and, by extension, self-
esteem through their profiles and postings.”29 Second, social media shapes the 
user’s perception of social events. Through the algorithms that the platforms have 
created to keep their users loyal to them, and have trapped users in a circle of 
information and other users who share similar characteristics. Also, this technology 
pushes the user to interact only with likeminded people.30 This process creates the 
“echo-chamber” phenomenon, which, “in this context, is taken to be an environment 
where people experience only similar opinions to their own, and where contradictory or 
alternative opinions are not considered.”31 Hence, the “echo-chamber” creates a personal 
online universe for the user, making him more vulnerable to extreme propaganda.32 For 
instance, the user comes in contact with a specific group of people who have the same 
 
28 Singer and Brooking, Like War: The Weaponization of Social Media, 248. 
29 Jim Taylor, “Technology: Is Technology Stealing Our (Self) Identities?,” Psychology Today, July 
27, 2011, http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-power-prime/201107/technology-is-technology-
stealing-our-self-identities. 
30 Frederic I. Solop, “‘RT@BarackObama We Just Made History’: Twitter and the 2008 Presidential 
Election,” in Communicator-in-Chief : How Barack Obama Used New Media Technology to Win the White 
House (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010), 47, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ebook-
nps/detail.action?docI. 
31 Reed D. Phill, “Are Echo Chambers a Threat to Intellectual Freedom?,” Psychology Today, March 
30, 2019, https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/digital-world-real-world/201903/are-echo-chambers-
threat-intellectual-freedom. 
32 Darrell M. West and Jack Karsten, “Inside the Social Media Echo Chamber,” Brookings (blog), 
December 9, 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2016/12/09/inside-the-social-media-echo-
chamber/. 
7 
views as him, and gradually he becomes marginalized from his peers. And if this online 
social circle develops more extreme ideas, then the user will become more extreme as 
well.33 
Furthermore, in such an isolated environment, all the trends that have shaped 
public opinion for years have also found application in social media, but to a much 
greater degree and intensity. The “CNN effect” is magnified in fractions of a second, with 
each serious event receiving colossal publicity in a minimum of time.34 Furthermore, 
many times the information about these events is distorted through manipulations with 
the help of amplified mechanisms, such as bots and trolls.35 Finally, the protagonists of 
events that gained much publicity have often emerged as public personas who influence 
social life in various ways.36 Social media has given great power to these people who can 
more easily influence their followers, making para-social interaction contact on a more 
personal level.37 
The new possibilities of the Internet, which have enabled the increased interaction 
between users, have changed the tactics of terrorists. In the recruitment of new members, 
the groups no longer need to wait for the candidate to approach them, but instead can 
employ an aggressive tactic and approach the future terrorists themselves.38 As Ella 
Minty highlights, “this “echo-chamber” was to put best use by the Islamic State in Iraq 
and Syria (ISIS) and its extremists to attract more and more supporters and incite 
 
33 Christina Pazzanese, “Danger in the Internet Echo Chamber,” Harvard Law Today, March 21, 
2017, https://today.law.harvard.edu/danger-internet-echo-chamber/. 
34 Bloom, “Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share, and Outbidding,” 85–86. 
35 J.-B. Jeangène Vilmer et al., Information Manipulation: A Challenge for Our Democracies (Paris, 
France: Policy Planning Staff (CAPS) of the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs and the Institute for 
Strategic Research (IRSEM), 2018), 83–84, 
https://www.rcmediafreedom.eu/Publications/Reports/Information-Manipulation-A-Challenge-for-Our-
Democracies. 
36 Monahan, The Shock of the News: Media Coverage and the Making of 9/11, 35. 
37 Donald Horton and R. Richard Wohl, “Mass Communication and Para-Social Interaction: 
Observations on Intimacy at a Distance,” Psychiatry 19, no. 3 (August 1956): 215, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00332747.1956.11023049. 
38 Weimann, Terrorism in Cyberspace: The Next Generation, 19. 
8 
disenfranchised youth to acts of terrorism across Europe, Middle East, and U.S.”39 This 
can be seen in the numbers of foreign fighters who traveled to join the IS army. The 
International Centre for the Study of Radicalization (ICSR) estimated that by 2015 
20,000 foreign fighters had gone to Syria, of which about 4,000 were European Union 
(EU) residents or nationals.40 
 
 
39 Ella Minty, Social Media and the Islamic State, 1st ed. (London & New York: Routledge, 2020), 
24. 
40 Peter R. Neumann, “Foreign Fighter Total in Syria/Iraq Now Exceeds 20,000; Surpasses 
Afghanistan Conflict in the 1980s,” ICSR (blog), January 26, 2015, https://icsr.info/2015/01/26/foreign-
fighter-total-syriairaq-now-exceeds-20000-surpasses-afghanistan-conflict-1980s/. 
9 
II. TERRORISM IN MEDIA 
A. A SHORT HISTORY OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
TERRORISTS AND MEDIA  
The use of the media by Islamists to preach their message dates back several 
years. Jihadists use audiovisual media for their strategic communications, and have been 
changing these practices over the past few decades to reflect the changes in the conflict 
mode and technology. Khomeini was the first in Iran to use videotape to spread his 
message against the Shah.41 Originally from Iraq, and then from Paris, Khomeini 
recorded cassettes non-stop and then distributed them to the world. In 1979, for example, 
about 110,000 cassettes of Khomeini speeches were released.42 Through the example of 
Khomeini, it is possible to observe some principles that have prevailed in the use of 
media for the dissemination of messages. First, with these videotapes, Khomeini was able 
to avoid the Shah’s censorship. Second, fans could easily copy the cassettes’ contents to 
as many copies as they wanted, and they, in turn, could share them with others. So, since 
Khomeini could not speak on Iranian radio or television, he could reach any Iranian 
through the tapes. Finally, with 60% of Iranians illiterate in 1977, the audio version of 
Khomeini’s speeches bypassed this difficulty.43 The prevailing conditions in Iran at that 
time made video and audio tapes the right tool for the right job.  
Similarly, in the 1980s, the Mujahideen of Afghanistan used audio cassettes, 
printed journals, and videotapes to secure donations and attract foreign fighters. Over the 
next decade, as jihadist fighters from the Bosnian war spread to the Kashmir hills, their 
propaganda grew and acquired additional forms such as battlefield films, audio wills, and 
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pamphlets.44 With the advent of the Internet as a means of propagating propaganda, the 
jihadists began to reach a growing audience. It is also the period when the jihadists set up 
the first forums as a reference point for terrorist circles and broadcast the first videos 
depicting extreme violence.45 
Al Qaeda and its affiliates were the first terrorist organizations to systematically 
use the media in all its forms to spread their propaganda. AQAP began by publishing the 
first radical Islamist online magazine in 2003. The magazine was in Arabic and edited by 
Sawt al-Jihad (Voice of Jihad). The magazine was published until 2005 when the security 
authorities of Saudi Arabia shut it down.46 In the same year, al Qaeda published the 
bimonthly magazine al-Fursan, which continued until 2007. In the meantime, the AQ 
Islamic media front, Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF), published the weekly magazine 
of Sada al-Rafidayn (“The echo of the two rivers”).47 Jabhat al-Nuṣra, the al Qaeda 
affiliate in Syria, also published the English-language magazine al Risalah, a magazine 
that attempted to build the legitimacy and religious authority of al-Nuṣra against the IS.48 
These magazines are some of the many jihadist magazines that have been published ever 
since. At first, most of them were in Arabic, but then magazines were published in many 
other languages, including Urdu, German, Russian, French, English, and Turkish.49 AQ’s 
most famous magazine, and to be precise its AQAP subsidiary, was the English-language 
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online magazine Inspire in 2010. One of the reasons it gained fame was that it was used 
by the Tsarnaev brothers to assemble the pressure-cooker bombs with which they 
executed the terrorist attack on the Boston Marathon in 2013. According to the leadership 
of the AQAP, the purpose of the magazine was to be a call to the Muslims of the West 
and to inspire them to jihad against the Western world.50 
B. THE ISLAMIC STATE AND THE MEDIA  
The Islamic State was following in the footsteps of its parent organization al 
Qaeda and, with careful planning, advanced the media’s strategic use to a higher level.51 
The IS staff’s plan was based on four pillars: human resources, structure, propaganda, 
and the media. Starting with human resources, the IS leadership recognized the 
importance of selecting specialized staff so that they could adequately operate the group’s 
media campaign. The group tried to recruit staff with special skills such as videographers, 
producers, and editors because it knew that their specialized knowledge would help 
develop the media campaign, which for IS was a critical mission.52 The IS gave those 
who belonged to this group of “media people” many privileges, such as a much higher 
salary than the fighters, a car, and a house.53 In addition to the role of reward for the 
knowledge “media people” provided, these privileges also served as a call for recruiting 
new qualified personnel.54 The leadership of IS has benefited significantly from this 
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practice. They have found “photojournalists” willing to cover all the fronts that the group 
was fighting and to transfer images and videos showing its greatness.55 From a technical 
perspective, the videos broadcast by IS reached a level that many scholars have 
characterized as Hollywood-produced, contributing significantly to the jihadist media 
campaign’s success.56 Finally, the group’s media activity on all kinds of Internet 
platforms, aimed at “advertising” the Caliphate, could only be compared in size to large 
Western companies, far surpassing rival jihadist groups in the social media war.57 
The second pillar concerns the structure and functions of the Islamic State media 
wing. Following Western business models, the group split the media wing into sections. 
The media administrative structure undergirded sections dedicated to the collection, 
evaluation, production, and distribution of the media products. Its core elements 
comprised the Media Council, the Media Agencies and Offices, the Media Judiciary 
Committee, the Information Bank, and the Media Security Office.58 The group also set 
up a sophisticated decentralized network of media centers such as al-Furqan, al-Hayat, al-
I’tisam, al-Battar, Ajnad, and al-A’maq. These centers functioned from different places, 
although most of these centers existed only virtually, and were responsible for the 
publication, release, and distribution of group propaganda materials.59 Furthermore, as 
stated in the business strategy, the group has recognized “the need to digitize the real 
world so as to retain a competitive advantage in an increasingly commoditized 
environment [and that] remains a strategic imperative. Al-Hayat Media, the official 
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media channel of ISIS, operates in an organic manner overseeing several other media 
divisions such as Wilayat Ninawa, Al-Anbar, Baghdad, Fallujah, Al-Furat, Ad-Dijlah, 
Kirkuk and Ar-Raqqah and empowering each province to provide unique updates 
pertaining to its own developments.”60 
The third pillar was the propaganda shared by the Islamic State. The IS spread its 
propaganda aiming to reach potential recruits,61 invite foreign fighters to join its ranks,62 
deliver messages to its adversaries,63 and instigate attacks in Western countries.64 The 
full spectrum of IS propaganda messaging included brutality, mercy, victimhood, 
belonging, militarism, and apocalyptic utopianism.65 All these narratives used as central 
messages in the creation of the IS propaganda campaign were not new; they are one of 
the basic concepts that dominate the jihadist movement. But there were essential details 
in how IS implemented the propaganda that made it so effective.66 The Internet-savvy 
terrorists, having a “target marketing” policy, targeted specific groups of the population 
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with material depending on the purpose pursued.67 For example, IS propaganda spread a 
message that the group provided protection and status to the women of the Caliphate.68 
The group also adopted a hip-hop style in some of its videos to make them familiar to 
young Western Muslims.69 Yet, in addition to the hip hop style aimed at foreigners, the 
IS, giving great importance to the quality of its propaganda products, also incorporated 
“anashid” into its propaganda for the locals to inspire them and make them unite for the 
common purpose of the IS.70 This differentiation in the choice of music investment for 
the group’s propaganda products was part of IS’s careful design. The IS media operators 
chose the content of the propaganda message according to the target audience.71 In sum, 
for IS, propaganda was perhaps the greatest weapon. When Mosul finally fell, Iraqis 
there, who had been influenced by the terror propaganda launched by the IS against them, 
surrendered the city, and many likened it to the fall of the French front in 1940. The 
Germans then used the radio to sow terror among French soldiers, which contributed to 
the German blitzkrieg’s success and the fall of France.72  
The last pillar was the means used by the Islamic State. The sophisticated 
planning of the IS propaganda campaign included every possible means that could 
advance the group’s message.73 The jihadists knew that they would achieve 
legitimization with locals and with global jihadism through the systematic and continuous 
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dissemination of information.74 Through the analysis of this campaign, it comes to light 
that the group used propaganda videos, radio, magazines, social media, forums, blogs, 
and chat rooms. According to Logan Macnair and Richard Frank, “these audiovisual 
media have been recognized for their technical complexity, high production value, 
consistent traffic, and multilingual character⎯all of which contribute to building a stable 
and legitimate brand image.”75 IS, from the first moment of its existence back in 2014 
when Al-Baghdadi declared the establishment of the Caliphate,76 made widespread use 
of social media, exploiting its potential in the absence of security measures by Western 
authorities in the Internet space.77 
Briefly, as they are analyzed in more depth in Chapter IV, IS media operatives 
usually do not post the group’s material on specific servers but use several free and open 
platforms, including Google drive, Yandesk, Cloud.mail.ru, Sendvid.com, YouTube, 
Dailymotion.com, Archive.org, Justpaste.it, Bitly.com, Drive.ms, and others.78 
Moreover, since hosted content must actually reach the target audience and wider public, 
IS media operatives use global web platforms like Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, 
Telegram, WhatsApp, Tumblr, Google+, Pinterest, Viber, and WeChat.79 
The IS also used its magazines to spread its propaganda, as did other terrorist 
groups. Before its proclamation as a Caliphate, the group published the Ṣawt al-Shām 
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magazine in Arabic.80 The group also published military and political reports during the 
same period, such as through the Islamic State News (ISN) and the Islamic State Report 
(ISR), respectively.81 After 2014, when the Caliphate was declared, the group published 
several magazines, online and offline, which were of different types, content, and 
language. The group published newsletters, such as the weekly Sanā al-Shām,82 and the 
official IS newspaper, al-Naba.83 The magazine that was the flagship of the IS 
propaganda campaign was Dabiq, and its later form named Rumiyah. Dabiq was 
published in parallel with the proclamation of the establishment of the Caliphate and, 
according to al-Ḥayāt Media Center, the publisher of Dabiq, its “mission […] is to 
convey a message of the Islamic State in different languages with the aim of unifying the 
Muslims under one flag.”84 Dabiq was renamed Rumiyah when IS lost the city of the 
same name to its rivals in 2016, also published by al-Ḥayāt Media Center.85 The 
magazine in both its forms appeared online and in several different languages, including 
English, French, German, Russian, Indonesian, and Uyghur.86 Also, the magazine’s two 
titles were symbolic and all the issues’ content supported the strategic goals of the 
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Islamic State propaganda. Finally, following the “target marketing” policy, the group 
published some magazines in a specific language and content according to the Muslims 
living in these areas. Τhe IS media wing put in place a Russian-language magazine 
named Istok (The Source) targeted future supporters from the Caucasus. Moreover, it 
launched the magazine Konstantiniyye (Constantinople) in Turkish, which offered 
essential points to the group’s strategy about Turkey. Furthermore, targeting French 
Muslims, the group issued the French magazine Dar al-Salam (the House of Peace).87  
Besides the modern means of spreading propaganda, the Islamic State also used 
traditional means to spread its message, especially within its territory. The group founded 
the Al-Bayan radio station, one of the most effective IS propaganda machine tools.88 
This radio informed the locals about the situation on the war fronts and the news, under 
the supervision of Idhā’at al-Bayān. The broadcasts were initially broadcast in English, 
Arabic, Russian, and Kurdish, and a little later, French was added.89 The Al-Bayan radio 
network had been framed as “highly professional” and compared to the BBC and NPR 
for its quality and tone.90 Moreover, in order to achieve the spread of its propaganda in 
its territory, the IS organized a network of “media points.” These points were cyber 
information booths in towns across the IS territory that provide religious and IS-related 
materials to the locals. According to IS leadership, the “media points” generated much 
interest among the people and were very well received. In fact, this network of points was 
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 group controlled by providing access to its pamphlets, videos, and other promotional and 
educational materials, and especially in areas where the population did not have Internet 
access or had an unstable Internet network.91 
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III. ISLAMIC STATE MEDIA STRATEGIES  
This chapter explores the aspects of the Islamic State’s media strategy, which 
existing research has not sufficiently examined. These aspects concern in what ways the 
IS exploited the social media landscape to deliver costly signals that advanced the 
group’s strategies of outbidding, intimidation, and polarization. This chapter reviews 
online magazines, videos, and images created and distributed by the Islamic State through 
various social media channels. In this material, the main issues that support the three 
strategies adopted by the Islamic State will be sought. The research focuses on the two 
versions of IS’s online magazine, Dabiq and Rumiyah. Additionally, this chapter 
compares the existing research on this magazine with the results gleaned from this 
analysis. 
The chapter begins by describing the IS intimidation strategy and argues that the 
IS exploited the social media landscape to intimidate the resistant internal forces and 
Western countries to keep them out of the Islamic State’s area of action. The chapter then 
demonstrates that the Islamic State portrayed itself through social media as either violent 
or caring to outbid rival terrorist groups. Following it examination of the outbidding 
strategy, this chapter also examines the ways in which IS sought to win over locals or 
recruit foreign fighters, given the competition from Al Qaeda. The last strategy covered 
by this analysis is polarization, in which the Islamic State, by spreading extremist acts 
against certain groups of people, polarized populations either inside (Sunnis vs. Shiites) 
or outside its territory (Muslims vs. non-Muslims). Finally, the chapter closes with the 
presentation of data extracted from analysis of the magazine’s covers and the 
conclusions. 
A. INTIMIDATION STRATEGY 
Intimidation is a strategy that, according to Kydd and Walter, is similar to the 
“strategy of deterrence, preventing some undesired behavior by means of threats and 
20 
costly signals.”92 The Islamic State adopted this strategy mainly for three reasons. First, 
IS used intimidation to try to assure the community that the group is strong enough to 
punish disobedience or treason and that the coalition of the Syrian and Iraqi governments 
and Western countries is too weak to stop the IS. This effort also aimed to convince 
people to behave as the group wished. The punishment dynamics needed to be strong 
enough to scare and deter the opponent so as not to take any action undesirable for the 
group. Punishment plays the same important role as the strategy of deterrence.93 Second, 
through this strategy, IS sought to intimidate and dominate rival terrorist groups. And 
finally, it wanted to send a clear message to the West to stay out.94 To achieve the 
objectives just mentioned, IS used social media and the Internet to portray its horrors to 
as large an audience as possible.95 IS carefully managed the messages that accompanied 
these actions in order to have the desired result.96 Its aim was to intimidate, sending 
targeted messages to its victims, and to present itself as the toughest and most invincible 
jihadist group in the world.97 
Zarqawi, the spiritual father of IS, also adopted the strategy of intimidation. He 
implemented this strategy not only in the Iraqi security forces but also with external 
factors. The targeting of the Iraqi security forces began during the al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) 
period, with the well-known slogan “for every ten bullets, nine should be directed toward 
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the apostates and one toward the crusaders.”98 This tactic was intended to instill as much 
fear as possible in the Iraqis who served in these units, so that they would not cooperate 
with the Crusaders, and at the same time, it would weaken these units so they did not 
pose a measurable opponent to the jihadists.99 Moreover, Zarqawi successfully adopted a 
strategy of intimidation to put off foreign intervention in Iraq. First, he wanted to stop the 
U.S. project to rebuild Iraq with other Muslim states’ participation. After the bombing of 
the Arab embassy by the AQI, no Muslim state wanted to participate in the U.S. project. 
To keep non-government organizations (NGO) out of Iraq and dampen their influence 
over the Iraqi population, Zarqawi attacked a hotel where United Nations (UN) officials 
stayed.100 
Additionally, the Islamic State used violent scenes to intimidate police and 
soldiers in Iraq and Syria to lower their morale. This situation favored the group, which 
could move forward without finding strong resistance.101 Videos were released showing 
IS death squads killing Iraqi security personnel, with some of the videos showing the 
victims begging for their lives before being killed. When the IS arrived in Mosul, it 
attacked the Camp Speicher military base near Tikrit, the hometown of Saddam 
Hussein.102 The group killed 1,700 Shia Iraqi soldiers serving there after occupying the 
base. The IS immediately broadcast a video of the killing of the soldiers.103 According to 
Iraq’s former national security adviser Mowaffak al-Rubaie, τhe images of violence and 
terrorism spread by IS through Facebook and Twitter, were the reason that Mosul fell 
into the terrorist group’s hands, after 30,000 Iraqi Security Forces soldiers retreated for 
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fear that they would also fall into the hands of the group.104 And during the takeover of 
the Syrian 17th division outside Raqqa, the IS applied a similar intimidation tactic.105 
The group beheaded 50 Syrian soldiers and then photographed the heads of the soldiers in 
Raqqa, sending a message about how the IS manages to control the areas under its 
rule.106 The fall of Ramadi was another example of the IS’s tactics. In the first two days 
of the city’s occupation the group executed 500 police members.107  
Similarly, the IS applied a model of extreme violence to the areas it occupied to 
achieve the absolute obedience of the inhabitants of those areas.108 Testimonies of 
refugees fleeing IS-occupied areas confirmed the fact that the group knew how to use the 
killings to intimidate locals and force them to obey.109 IS crucified two men in Raqqa 
and they left their bloody corpses displayed in the center of a town. Another ancient form 
of torture was also used by the IS as a sign of how life is under the rule of the group.110 
After the conquest of the city of Mosul, the group released videos showing Iraqi men 
being hanged, crucified, or burned to death.111 In addition, the group used chainsaws to 
slaughter nine young people in public view at a Mosul square because they belonged to a 
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group that was opposed to IS.112 Moreover, IS launched a campaign of assassinations 
against Sunni “traitors”113 as a warning to the Iraqi population not to ally themselves 
with the Iraqi authorities, the Americans, or others who opposed the IS, such as the Sunni 
Sahwa militias who allied with Maliki.114 Taylor Berman reports that “ISIS released a 
gruesome new video showing the execution of 16 prisoners. Five of the prisoners were 
filmed as they slowly drowned inside a metal cage while four others were blown up by an 
RPG as they were handcuffed inside a car. Another seven were killed by explosives that 
an ISIS member had strapped around their necks.” 115  
Implementing the group’s version of Sharia law was central to IS’s governance in 
the areas it controlled. The group imposed a set of stringent rules and prohibitions, with 
offenders being punished as an example, so that locals would show obedience to the 
IS.116 In Iraq’s Nineveh province, for example, IS members threw two men out of a 
building in front of an audience because they thought they were gay.117  There are photos 
of two crucified men who were accused of theft in the same province and a woman being 
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stoned to death for adultery.118 Finally, another aspect of IS’s use of instilling fear in the 
locals is to maintain the faith of the local fighters who join the terrorist group. According 
to Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Nathaniel Barr, and Bridget Moreng, the group had 
problems recruiting Syrians and then keeping them loyal to the group.119 The pattern of 
exemplary punishment was also applied to foreign fighters when some tried to escape.120  
In addition to the Iraqi authorities, the Islamic State also used violence against 
tribes in the regions under its control, and especially against those tribes who might dare 
to resist. Thus, one video, depicting the massacre of about 700 men of the al-Sheitaat 
tribe, resulted in the tribe’s sheikh begging the IS to show pardon and mercy. Another 
tribe that suffered from IS atrocities was the Albu Alwan tribe. When its siege by the IS 
ended, there were 500 members of the tribe dead, and 25,000 tribal members left the 
area.121  In this respect, IS did not act like the AQI; many times the IS preferred to use 
intimidation as a tactic against tribes that opposed it, rather than negotiating. For 
example, the IS slaughtered 150 men of the Albu Nimr tribe in the Anbar province, a 
tribe that has been opposed to the jihadist movement since the Awakening period.122 An 
issue related to the intimidation of the tribes was slavery and the way in which the 
captured people were treated as slaves. The IS used the issue of slavery mainly to 
intimidate the youth of the enemy, and especially girls, as was the case with the 
enslavement of Yazidi girls.123 The IS refers to the Yazidi sect as ‘devil worshipers,’ 
claiming the Yazidi were polytheists, and so the Yazidis were deserving of death or 
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slavery.124 When captured by the IS, Yazidi women, in particular, had two choices. 
Either they embraced Islam and became slaves, or they would be raped to death.125 
The message that anyone who opposes IS will have the same outcome spread 
everywhere. The Kurdish Peshmerga fighters at the same time abandoned their positions 
in front of the IS forces, which were advancing unscathed towards their positions.126 The 
Peshmergas had an additional reason to fear the IS after allying themselves with the 
United States against the jihadists.127 Furthermore, the IS carried out violent attacks not 
only against the tribes but also other jihadist groups, prompting Ayman al-Zawahiri to 
expel the group from al Qaeda.128  
To advance its intimidation strategy against the West, the IS used two approaches. 
First, the group distributed extremist material on its media platforms, mainly showing the 
beheading of prisoners, to send the message to stay out of the Caliphate. Second, as the 
Western coalition became involved in Syria, and the Caliphate lost ground, the group 
launched terrorist attacks in various Western countries. 
The IS, following an older tactic of intimidation, that of beheading, proceeded to 
spread through its media the videos with such content where its victims were mainly 
Westerners. As Lisa J. Campbell states “the use of beheadings has a longstanding history. 
Beheadings have been used in a state and non-state capacity, for punishment or 
intimidation, against leaders, civilians and warring combatants, during times of peace and 
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that of upheaval.”129 The peculiarity of beheading, combined with the over-promotion 
that the mass media can give, was something that Zarkawi had understood, since he was 
the pioneer in such executions. He also understood the enormous impact that beheadings 
had on the West.130 In 2004, the American contractor Nicholas Berg’s beheading by 
Zarkawi was the first video with a beheading released by the AQI. Michael Weiss and 
Hassan Hassan observe that “[t]he staging and pageantry of this grotesquerie was also 
transformational for the future of international terrorism.”131 After all, it was Zarqawi 
who argued that AQI should fill the hearts of every enemy of Islam with fear.132  
The series of videos of prisoners’ beheadings, which are almost identical to each 
other with the victims wearing the orange Guantanamo prison uniform, began with the 
video named ‘A message to America.’133 The first victim was American journalist James 
Wright Foley.134 It was in this video that the protagonist of the beheadings, known as 
Jihadi-John, first appeared, during which he blamed America for its actions in Iraq and 
presented Foley’s beheading as retribution for the air strikes commanded by President 
Obama in August 2014.135 Moreover, according to the landmark book detailing a 
strategy for radical Islamists Management of Savagery, if the enemy acts aggressively, he 
should be repaid with extreme violence. Foley “paid the price” for the U.S. airstrikes.136 
In the same Foley video, the executioner showed another IS prisoner, the American 
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photojournalist Steven Joel Sotloff, and he threatened the United States that if the 
military operations approved against the group were not stopped, the IS would execute 
him.137 The second video that the Islamic State finally released was the beheading of 
Sotloff.138 In the same video, terrorists threatened the life of another captive, a Briton, 
David Cawthorne Haines, with the following words: “[w]e take this opportunity to warn 
those governments that enter this evil alliance of America against the Islamic State to 
back off and leave our people alone.”139 Another clear message to the West and those 
who allied with them was the immolation of the Jordanian pilot Moaz al-Kasasbeh.140 
The video with the beheading of British aid worker Alan Henning was also a 
response to the UK decision to allow airstrikes in Iraq.141 The continuing wave of 
beheadings by the IS caused panic around the world. After Henning, a Japanese 
journalist,142 Kurdish and Syrian soldiers, and Egyptian and Ethiopian Christians were 
also killed with this horrifying method of execution.143 Finally, the Islamic State, in 
addition to videos of its own actions, presented videos in the West where the content 
depicted the violence and destruction caused by Western coalition forces.144 The 
casualties and casualties of people in Iraq and Syria from Western coalition airstrikes 
were the reason why, instead of following the IS-registered practice to execute the 
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Jordanian pilot (beheading), they preferred to burn him.145 It was a clear message to the 
West that ‘If you burn us, we burn you.’146 
As the Caliphate began to shrink, the IS launched terrorist attacks outside IS 
territories. By carrying out these attacks, the Islamic State wanted to send the message 
that even under the pressure it was receiving from the opposing forces, it was able to 
spread its attacks to the territory of these states as well. In doing so, the IS wanted to 
terrorize the citizens of the states that formed a coalition against the IS, as well as to 
prevent these states from continuing to fight the Islamic State or to offer assistance to 
Iraqis and Kurds who were fighting the IS.147 
In addition to the disgusting images circulating on the Internet, as well as the 
threatening messages, the terrorist attacks inside the territory of Western countries, 
carried out by the supporters of the group, were an additional factor of intimidation.148 
The group’s spokesman, Al-Adnani, urged the group’s supporters to terrorize the 
residents of these countries so much that “the neighbor fears his neighbor.”149 By 
organizing/inspiring/conducting terrorist attacks in Europe, the IS demonstrated the 
group’s ability to hit back at the EU states.150 The group terrorized European citizens 
with its attacks to warn their governments not to get involved in the war in Syria. In 
Germany, for example, after a series of terrorist attacks in that country, the prime 
minister of Bavaria, Horst Seehofe, came out and said that the citizens of the country 
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were “riled up” and “full of fear.”151 And despite the recent territorial losses of the IS, 
which led to its downturn, there has been great concern that the remaining supporters of 
the group through the now virtual caliphate will remain a significant threat to the 
West.152 
B. OUTBIDDING STRATEGY 
The outbidding strategy is adopted by a group when it wants to dominate an area 
and gain the support of the residents of that area, while the group must compete with 
other groups that already exist there. Demonstrating strength and extreme violence are 
ways a group can convince the public to take the side of the group.153 The IS adopted its 
outbidding strategy to achieve two strategic goals. The first strategic goal was the 
establishment and consolidation of the Caliphate. The second one was the domination of 
the jihadist movement, an open conflict with al Qaeda. To achieve these goals, the IS 
disseminated through the media material from acts of atrocities, as well as a series of 
narratives, to persuade its audience to follow the IS. 
The IS narratives moved mainly on two axes. The first axis concerned the creation 
of the state by the IS and how life was in this state. The IS propaganda worked to prove 
that the IS had succeeded in creating a state, and the group was capable of governing and 
providing security and prosperity in the areas it conquered. The display of the black flag 
of the IS and the black uniform of the group members was the attempt of the jihadist 
media to create the image of an organized state.154 Ahmed S. Hashim states that “IS’s 
media also had another mission: to portray how wonderful life was in the Islamic utopia. 
As a result of IS’s venture into governance following the capture of large swathes of 
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territory in Syria and Iraq after 2013, it deployed its media to portray itself as a group 
capable of leadership of a state.”155 The Wilayat state system’s implementation and the 
creation of the currency were two of the main themes of IS propaganda, seeking to 
highlight the structural changes the group made to build the Caliphate.  
Also, IS showed that it cares for needy and orphaned children.156 Jad Melki and 
May Jabado analyzed a series of videos produced by Al-Hayat Media Center in 2015. 
Through images of children playing carefree, markets full of people and goods, water and 
electricity, the group wanted to show that the Caliphate had come to stay. IS had 
managed to build a harmonious Caliphate so that its citizens could live in peace.157 
Furthermore, IS propaganda, with the aim of gaining the support of locals and foreign 
fighters from other terrorist groups, shared on social media images of terrorists with 
kittens or Nutella containers. The intention was to show that it was cool for someone to 
belong to the Islamic State.158 Eventually, the IS, to prove that it could govern effectively 
in the areas it occupied, imposed order on Iraq’s and Syria’s turbulent environment and 
provided the locals with basic services, such as offering cheap medical care, distributing 
petrol or aid to locals, offering classes to teach the Quran.159 All IS’s actions led some 
locals to consider the group better at governing the territory than al-Assad, the Iraqi 
government, or other militias.160  
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The second axis that promoted the IS narratives was its Islamic correctness.161 
The group boasted that it had enforced Sharia law and that was what made the group 
stand out.162 According to the group, the state they founded provided protection to the 
Ummah from the injustice and inferiority the community experienced currently.163 
Sharia provides a place for Muslims to practice the texts and traditions of early Islam.164 
For this reason, this state could rightly be described as a Caliphate. As Jan Christoffer 
Andersen and Sveinung Sandberg argue, “the caliphate also has a more prophetic role in 
the rhetoric, and IS believes that the creation of a de facto state (the caliphate) serves as 
evidence of IS’s religious sincerity and God’s acceptance.”165 The promotion of the 
Caliphate and the advantages of living under Sharia was in the effort of IS to win the 
hearts and minds of Muslims and to obtain further funding from donors.166 The media 
platforms belonging to the IS presented the Caliphate’s narrative in two anti-diametric 
ways. On the one hand, they featured images from Muslim holiday celebrations, such as 
Ramadan, with worshipers participating in the celebrations as well as sermons and 
prayers.167 On the other hand, the circulation of images of stoning, crucifixion, and 
beheading of Sharia law violators was intended to act as a signal that the IS, being rightly 
a Caliphate, is practicing Islamic Law.168 
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To establish the Caliphate, the IS also had to displace its rivals from Syria and 
Iraq. As soon as the IS announced the establishment of the Caliphate, the group called on 
all jihadist groups to unite under its banner.169 This call provoked the reaction of some 
groups to oppose the IS.170 The group in Syria and Iraq had to deal with such rival 
groups as the Free Syrian Army, Ahlu Sunna Waljamaa, or Jaysh Rijaal al-Tariqa al-
Naqshbandia, and Jabhat al-Nusra.171 The IS engaged in a variety of actions, fraught 
with tension, which they performed occasionally to dominate their opponents. Starting 
with the mildest action, where the Islamic State, through social media, launched very 
negative characterizations of its opponents in order to humiliate them in the eyes of the 
locals. The central idea was to use anything that could underestimate, offend, or ridicule 
IS’s opponents. Thus, all the opponents of the group were kuffars (roughly translated as 
“disbelievers”), cowards, incompetents, and hypocrites.172 For example, the IS considers 
the Nusra Front as apostates “because they fight alongside foreign-backed groups.”173 
Moreover, IS launched a Twitter campaign aimed to highlight al-Nusra’s weaknesses.174 
Along with the transmission of negative messages about its opponents, the group also 
broadcasted messages presenting themselves as true believers and defenders of the 
Sunnis.175  
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The Islamic State broadcast images of its victorious outcome against its 
opponents, to show that the IS is superior to them.176 Of course, these images also 
contained the necessary violence, which acted as a deterrent for the group’s opponents. 
Thus, in the video “Flames of War” the group mentions about 800 prisoners, who seem to 
be digging their own graves and in the end are executed by the men of the Islamic State 
standing in front of them. It was the perfect combination of superiority and 
intimidation.177 In addition, the constant broadcasting of IS victories, the bombardment 
of enemy forces, and the portrayal of the group’s fighters as extremely brave were 
intended to convey a clear message. Whoever was with IS experienced the ultimate 
victory and glory; otherwise, he had to be prepared to face the inevitable defeat.178 
At the same time, through the dominance of these groups, and in particular Al-
Nusra, and the demonstration of its strength on the battlefield, IS was trying to dethrone 
al Qaeda from the position of world leader of the jihadist groups and take its place.179 Al 
Qaeda has been the dominant jihadist movement for several years, but its network has 
become increasingly threatened by the IS. The extreme violence used indiscriminately by 
the Islamic State, as well as the proclamation of the Caliphate, were what brought the two 
groups together in the final conflict. For its part, the IS was trying to bring to the fore all 
the shortcomings of AQ, with the ultimate goal of undermining the strength and 
legitimacy of al Qaeda. For the IS, AQ was a segregated, declining organization. This 
controversy is also evident in the social media posts by fans of both groups. There was a 
strong controversy between al Qaeda and ISIS on Twitter, with IS supporters calling al 
Qaeda members and leadership “Jihadi Jews,” implying that al Qaeda’s purpose was no 
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longer truly Islamic or that al Qaeda is linked to Israel.180 Finally, from this 
confrontation with al Qaeda, the IS aimed mainly at the new generation of jihadists and 
foreign fighters,181 because they knew it would be difficult to attract al Qaeda’s “old 
guard.”182  
The terrorist attacks in the West, the images of extreme violence, and the flight of 
many foreign fighters were the factors that turned authorities and academics to study IS 
propaganda in terms of its influence in the West. Although the West was a target of the 
group’s media, it was not its main target. For the IS and for creating the Caliphate that the 
group wanted, the immediate priority was the locals in Iraq and Syria. The second 
priority was the group of Muslims from the Middle East and North Africa and, in the end, 
the attraction of foreign fighters. Ali Fisher and Nico Prucha point out that “the native 
Sunni Arabs are their prime target audience. As a result, the jihadist movement is almost 
entirely directed in Arabic and its content is intimately tied to the socio-political context 
of the Arab world.”183 
J. M. Berger and Jonathon Morgan conducted an extensive survey of more than 
20,000 Twitter accounts between October 4 and November 27, 2014. The sample of 
20,000 accounts is estimated by researchers to represent at least 93% of IS supporters. 
The analysis showed some critical elements that reinforce the view that the IS had as its 
primary target, the locals. First, the largest cluster of accounts (28%) was found in Syria 
and Iraq. The next largest cluster (27%) was in Saudi Arabia, and after these two clusters 
in no other country was there a cluster larger than 6%. While the languages used by the 
users of these accounts were Arabic (73%), English (18%), and French (6%), these 
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percentages reflect to which audience the IS propaganda was addressed and with what 
importance.184 In addition, the IS used direct personal contact and traditional means such 
as murals and billboards, with the same messages of its propaganda, in order to win over 
the local population.185 
In implementing its outreach strategy, the IS has developed a new approach to 
attracting foreign fighters. Although the group’s main target was the locals, as we said 
before, there should be no misunderstanding that the IS was not interested in foreign 
fighters. Foreign fighters have played an important role in the history of the jihadist 
movement since the 1980s.186 Foreign fighters offer war experience, ideology, and 
devotion to the struggle and the IS wanted these characteristics to establish the 
Caliphate.187 Moreover, the fact that the vast majority of foreign fighters who went to 
war in Syria fought for the IS was a blow to al Qaeda’s leadership. 
In addition to images of happy foreign fighters claiming that all they needed was a 
place like the Caliphate,188 the IS developed another kind of approach, mainly to 
Western Muslims. The Islamic State, with the help of social media and the Internet, had 
brought new aspects to the concept of ideology, beyond the common themes that had 
been used in earlier terrorist plots.189 To begin with, the Islamic State legitimized 
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transgression and violence through the creation of a subculture.190 After all, violence in 
quantities has always served as an incentive for foreign fighters.191 This subculture 
promoted violence, fraternity among members, jihadi-cool trends, and similar elements 
that make up street gang subcultures.192 In this way, IS opened the door for Europeans 
attracted to lawlessness and violence to find a space in which they could act freely.193 
They joined up with the Islamic State as part of a sort of “super-gang.”194 For example, 
the gesture of the raised right hand with a closed fist while the index finger is pointing 
upward, referring to tawhid (the oneness of God), used by IS members is also a gang 
symbol.195  
Finally, the IS tactics’ strategic side applied during the attacks it organized or 
supported in countries outside Syria-Iraq should be analyzed. The IS used “broad suicide 
mission” tactics during these attacks. The term “broad” includes attacks with suicide 
bombers as well as “lone wolves.” Most scholars have dealt more with the motives or 
how the “lone wolf” was radicalized rather than with the tactics of such an attack. Taking 
on a “lone wolf” mission by an attacker is similar to that of a suicide bomber, as in both 
cases, the terrorist is almost certain to die. This conclusion comes from many factors. 
First, the “take what you find and go out and kill as many as you can” mission violates 
any principle of successfully planning a strike mission, nor can such a mission be 
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described as a special operation mission.196 That is, before carrying out the attack, the 
perpetrator has neither planned a way to escape, nor a safe extraction from the target, nor 
information about the existence of police forces on the target. In general, the action plan 
of the “lone wolf” has many gaps, which in essence makes such a mission a “high risk” 
mission, or otherwise a suicide mission.197 Second, the IS called on all Muslims to attack 
the West in any way they can, which resulted in most of the attackers lacking the training 
or experience to carry out such a mission. So, the terrorists could hardly react to the 
resistance of the security forces. That is why most of them have been killed by police fire. 
In a study of terrorist attacks in Europe in 2015 and 2016, 65% of terrorists were killed 
on target by either suicide bombing or police fire. The remaining 35% were arrested by 
police.198 From these results it becomes clear that no terrorists managed to escape after 
their attacks. So, all missions have been doomed to either death or capture by the enemy 
(police). For example, two “IS soldiers,”199 as the IS-linked Amaq news agency called 
them, killed an 84-year-old priest and took four other people hostage in a church in 
northern France, before being found dead by fire from the French Police.200 
Yet, the IS strengthened the undertaking of “broad suicide missions” to advance 
the outbidding strategy. First, as Mohammed M. Hafez argues, “[g]roups that deploy 
suicide attacks appear the most daring, heroic, and sacrificing. These qualities naturally 
raise their legitimacy among the public in the context of conflict with outside groups.”201 
Second, taking, for example, the rivalry between Hamas and Islamic Jihad, suicide 
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missions play an essential role for a terrorist group in its quest to gain leadership of a 
movement.202 Correspondingly, the IS promoted suicide missions to take the lead from al 
Qaeda.203 In this way, the IS wanted to highlight the inability of al Qaeda to strike at the 
infidels, making it rightfully the group that should be at the top of the jihadist 
movement.204 In this context, it becomes more apparent why the IS carried out attacks in 
the West; it was mainly a matter of prestige and not to provoke Western leaders. The IS 
also had to make its own “9/11” to win the competition with al Qaeda. Finally, with these 
suicide attacks, the IS wanted to gain more supporters and donors, taking the share from 
AQ.205 
Simultaneously, suicide missions also advanced the other strategies adopted by 
the IS, which are studied in this paper. Beginning with the intimidation strategy, as 
Robert A. Pape explains, suicide attacks in whatever form have “in common a specific 
secular and strategic goal: to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces 
from territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland.”206 So the IS wanted to 
pressure the Western democracies not to send troops to its territory. In addition, the 
suicide missions cause terror because they show a side of the group that emphasizes that 
it is ready for anything and is not afraid of death either. While the group leaves open the 
fact that another attack can be made with maybe more victims at any time.207 
Finally, the attacks that have already taken place in Western societies, in 
combination with what the IS has projected and proclaimed, have created a phobia that at 
any time, a Muslim can pick up a vehicle and rush at a crowd or pick up a knife to attack 
unsuspecting citizens. This phobia resulted in the suspicion and marginalization of 
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Muslims by their fellow citizens and the oppression of Muslims by the police’s strict and 
unjust security measures. Both of these cases reinforce the IS’ polarization strategy. 
C. POLARIZATION STRATEGY 
The third strategy adopted by the IS was polarization. This strategy has its roots in 
Zarqawi and the landmark book Management of Savagery. Brian H. Fishman argues that 
“[t]he “Management of Savagery” book’s core message is that polarizing society through 
brutal violence is valuable to mobilize a reticent population.”208 The Islamic State began 
the polarization strategy in a sectarian context, mainly against the Shiites in Iraq.209 They 
then pursued this strategy in Western societies, and especially in Europe, to polarize 
Muslims and non-Muslims.210 In both cases, the group tried to push an “us vs. them” 
doctrine.211 The enemies of the IS did not wage war on the group but against Islam, 
according to this strategy. Through the study of relevant literature, Tyler Welch 
emphasizes the importance of the doctrine of “us against them” and states “[t]his us-
versus-them mentality can be an effective tool in unifying and motivating a terror 
group[.] Furthermore, articles in ISIS online magazines also securitize its enemies. With 
the perception of danger and constant contestation from “the other, securitization of the 
common enemy encourages urgent action outside the realm of calm policy debate, 
legitimizing violent action.””212 
For the analysis of the IS polarization strategy, as mentioned, the research should 
begin with the AQI. The ground in Iraq was conducive for the AQI to implement a 
 
208 Brian H. Fishman, The Master Plan, 1st ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2016), 38. 
209 Mohammed M. Hafez, “The Origins of Sectarian Terrorism in Iraq,” in The Evolution of the 
Global Terrorist Threat : From 9/11 to Osama Bin Laden’s Death, 1st ed. (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2014), 436–60; Celso, “Dabiq: IS’s Apocalyptic 21st Century Jihadist Manifesto,” 1. 
210 John Turner, “Manufacturing the Jihad in Europe: The Islamic State’s Strategy,” The International 
Spectator 55, no. 1 (2020): 113, https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2020.1712136. 
211 Colombo, “IS and the Others. A Topic Analysis of Pro- and Anti-IS Discourse on Arabic-
Speaking Twitter,” 80. 
212 Tyler Welch, “Theology, Heroism, Justice, and Fear: An Analysis of ISIS Propaganda Magazines 
Dabiq and Rumiyah,” Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict 11, no. 3 (2018): 191–92, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2018.1517943. 
40 
sectarian strategy, as for years, Saddam had presided over a sectarian protection system 
that largely favored the minority at the expense of an impoverished and upset 
majority.213 William McCants has emphasized that “Zarqawi hated the Shiites not only 
because they were traitors and collaborators of the Americans, but also because they 
served the Antichrist, just as the Americans did. At the end of time, the Antichrist will 
come to fight the Muslims. For this reason, Zarqawi wanted to start a civil sectarian war 
between Sunnis and Shiites, with the aim of eradicating the latter.”214 Zarqawi used 
extreme violence against Shiites in Iraq,215 and he explained in a letter that the “fighting 
against the Shi’a is the way to drag the [Islamic] nation into the battle.”216 For Zarqawi 
the worst enemy for the Sunnis was the Shiites, and also they were the key to change. By 
targeting and hitting Shia “in their religious, political, and military depth will provoke 
them to show the Sunnis their rabies and bare the teeth of the hidden rancor working in 
their breasts.”217 
To make his strategy a success, Zarqawi launched a campaign of terror against 
prominent Shiite clerics, civilians, and important Shia symbols. The hallmark of this 
campaign was suicide bombers. Between 2003 and 2006, AQI carried out 514 suicide 
attacks in Iraq.218 Attacks could range from a suicide bomber to large-scale complex 
attacks against multiple targets. In 2003, AQI launched attacks on markets, Shiite 
mosques, and cities, including Kadhimiya, Samarra, Najaf, Baquba, Howaidar, and Shiite 
areas of Baghdad. The main target of these attacks was Iraqi civilians. In the same year, 
the Zarqawi group attacked at the Imam Ali Mosque, one of Shia’s holiest mosques, and 
killed the leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution of Iraq, Ayatollah 
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Mohammad Baqr al-Hakim.219 In 2005, AQI using a suicide bombing killed 125 people 
in the Shia city of Hilla, many of whom were recruits for Iraqi security forces. The 
following year, AQI launched a series of suicide bombings in Karbala’s holy city, 
spreading death. The most valuable attack on Zarqawi’s campaign was the bombing of 
the al-Askariya Mosque in Samarra.220 The mosque is an important Shiite shrine that 
houses the tombs of the tenth and eleventh imams of the Shia faith, Ali al-Askari and his 
son Hasan al-Askari. This attack contributed igniting an unofficial civil war between 
Sunnis and Shiites.221 
The ISI, the successor to the AQI, pursued the same strategy, targeting either 
Shiites or security forces. So, the ground for the IS to exercise its polarization strategy 
was already prepared. The IS propaganda aimed to create a common enemy to achieve 
the unification of its group members into a united front. Furthermore, to strengthen this 
front, the group was trying to emphasize the righteousness of the IS operations, and on 
the other hand, to show in detail how wrong the IS enemies are. The group classifies its 
enemies into three groups: anti-Muslims, Muslims−apostates, and Muslims−supporters. 
The first group concerns all infidels, and especially America, Europe, and Israel, who aim 
to destroy the Arab world and Islam. The second group consists of Shiites and Muslims 
who deny the imposition of Islamic law. Finally, the third group is all Muslims who 
cooperate or support the two previous groups. 
The IS, as Zarqawi did, believed that the enemies within Islam were the worst. 
The group organized an offensive campaign against the internal enemy, making extensive 
use of extreme force. The group supported this campaign extensively through its media. 
The targets of these attacks were mainly people of different sects and their important 
symbols. The number one target of IS, like its predecessors, was the Shiites. According to 
IS’ beliefs, the Shia is a “heretical apostate group with Jewish origins that are driven by a 
 
219 Weiss and Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror, 30. 
220 Mohammed Hafez, “The Origins of Sectarian Terrorism in Iraq,” in The Evolution of the Global 
Terrorist Threat: From 9/11 to Osama Bin Laden’s Death, 1st ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2014), 436. 
221 Hashim, The Caliphate at War, secs. 4281–4289. 
42 
pathological need to corrupt and destroy Islam.”222 The main goal of the IS was to attack 
and provoke the Iraqi Shiites so that they would retaliate against their Sunni compatriots. 
The retaliation against the Sunnis by the Shiites would result in the former turning to the 
IS for protection. Thus, when the IS invaded and occupied Camp Speicher in Tikrit, it 
executed, according to Human Rights Watch, 770 Shiite soldiers who had surrendered. 
Moreover, when the group captured Mosul, it rushed to Badoush Prison and killed all the 
Shiite prisoners.223 But also the acts of revenge by the Shiites had a direct effect on 
Sunni groups such as the Islamic Army of Iraq, Ansar al-Sunnah and the Mujahideen 
Army, which while in 2007 united to fight AQI, in 2014 these groups helped ISIS to 
capture Fallujah. Eventually Zarqawi’s polarization strategy brought results.224 
In addition to its core areas in Iraq, IS used the same strategy in Syria when it 
occupied its territories. Syria had many similarities with Iraq, making it easy for the IS to 
implement its polarization strategy. Sectarianism in Syria has existed for many years. In 
particular, the ruling sect in Syria was the Alawites, who were the minority, exercising 
power over the Sunnis, who made up 75% of the population.225 The IS wanted to take 
advantage of this situation to recruit the Sunnis, trying to convince them that they were 
the victims and that they had been humiliated for years.226 Moreover, the Islamic State 
expanded its sectarian war beyond the Iraq-Syria front. With aggressive rhetoric and 
selective attacks, mainly on mosques, the Islamic State targeted Shiites in countries with 
large Shiite populations, including Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Yemen. In 2015, they 
bombed a mosque in Asir in Saudi Arabia, killing 13 Saudi security officers. That same 
year, IS carried out suicide bombings in Beirut’s Shiite neighborhood, killing 43 people. 
Both attacks were intended to undermine these states’ social cohesion by polarizing 
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relations between Shiite and Sunni communities in Saudi Arabia and Lebanon.227 By 
inciting sectarian strife in the Muslim community, the group aimed to present itself as the 
protector of Sunnis around the world.228 The IS stands beside and defends the 
community against “crusaders,” “the armies of the cross,” and “apostate rulers.”229 
Finally, the IS launched a campaign against religious monuments that were not in 
line with the group’s beliefs. The campaign involved Shiite, Sufi, and pagan monuments. 
Ιn 2014, the IS looted and destroyed the tombs of Prophet Shayth (Biblical Seth) and 
Prophet Yunus (Biblical Jonah), and after declaring that “the mosque of Prophet Yunus 
had become a place of apostasy and not of prayer,” they placed explosives and 
demolished it.230 The same year the IS dominated the village of Bashir of Taza, in the 
province of Kirkuk, where the group looted and blew up religious shrines and Shiite 
mosques.231 
In 2015, the IS destroyed the tomb of Mohammed bin Ali, who is worshiped as a 
saint by the Shiites. The group also blew up the Shrine of Abu Behaeddine, a 500-year-
old Sufi monument. Finally, the cultural monuments of Palmyra did not escape from the 
IS either. The group blew up and destroyed the Temples of Baalshamin and Bel 
monuments, while also distributing videos showing children killing 25 regime soldiers at 
the Roman Theater in Palmyra.232 
In Europe, as John Turner states, the IS “seeks to capitalize on existing inter-
communal tensions in Europe characterized by alienation, marginalization, and fear of 
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the other.”233 With this strategy, the Islamic State expects to persuade Muslims in a 
“gray” zone to move to the jihadist side, adopting a Dar al Harb / Dar al Islam.234 By this 
narrative, the group was trying to gain additional supporters, and especially those who 
did not have a clear stance, that is, whether they were for or against the IS.235 Finally, the 
Islamic State, through videos sent to social media, opened up to Muslims in the West. 
These Muslims might feel persecuted or oppressed in the countries they live in and the 
videos called on them to become members of a global Muslim population.236 
The key to achieving this IS strategy was to turn non-Muslims against Muslims. 
With its attacks and acts of extreme violence, the IS, exaggerating these two through its 
media, aimed to increase anti-Muslim hatred, Islamophobia,237 and the oppression of 
Muslims by the policies pursued by the Western authorities. The unjust and aggressive 
behavior of non-Muslims was what would fill the hearts of Western Muslims with 
grievances.238 Grievances are one of the main factors that produce extremism. Moreover, 
grievances create conditions for possible radicals. The IS wants to take full advantage of 
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grievances to broaden their prospective pool of recruits, attackers, sympathizers, and 
donors.  
First, the Islamic State’s terrorist attacks raised Europeans’ anxiety, filling them 
with fear, and as a result, the terrorists achieved their goal.239 Between 2014 and 2017, 
there were 51 jihadist attacks in North America and Europe. Of the 65 terrorists who 
carried out the attacks, 73% were citizens of the country in which they carried out the 
attack. This extensive percentage results in the citizens of these societies suspecting and 
marginalizing Muslims.240 As al Adnani did in his speech entitled “Indeed Your Lord Is 
Ever Watchful,” IS’s calls to the Muslims to attack the infidels in the West strengthened 
the climate against Muslims.241 When these calls became a reality through the terrorist 
attacks, the anti-Muslim climate intensified. 
Observing the reactions of citizens in France, Germany, Spain, and the UK, it is 
possible to draw certain conclusions related to their concerns about Islamic extremism. In 
2005, the year after the terrorist attack in London and one year after Madrid, 43% of the 
citizens in Spain, 35% in Germany, 34% in the UK, and 32% in France were concerned 
about the potential for Islamic extremism.242 In 2011 the rates were 32% in Spain, 26% 
in Germany, 31% in the UK, and 29% in France. In 2015, following the emergence of the 
Islamic State and its subsequent attacks, these rates almost doubled, reflecting the 
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concern of European citizens and the terror that the Islamic State gave birth to.243 
Moreover, the videos of beheadings and other extremes promoted by IS on the Internet 
had the effect of negatively impacting Western societies’ views of Muslims and linking 
Islam to violence. Simone Friis cites a PEW Research study that states “the number of 
Americans associating Islam with violence has risen dramatically to an all-time high of 
50% following the distribution of videotaped beheadings.”244  
At the same time, Islamophobia has been on the rise in Europe due to the 
combination of terrorist attacks and immigration.245 The climate against Muslims has 
been worsened by far-right parties or organizations that are flourishing in Europe.246 The 
negative behavior that Muslims experience from their European compatriots is a form of 
anti-Muslim racism, also known as Islamophobia.247 Islamophobia has to do with the 
phenomenon of unequal treatment of Muslim citizens in Western societies. This 
inequality is often combined with the dehumanization of Muslims in the perception of 
their Western compatriots. Thus, while Muslims are the victims of physical attacks and 
political restrictions, they are often confronted with a climate of distrust and hostility 
from the authorities and society when they turn to them to defend themselves. As Enes 
Bayrakli and Farid Hafez state that “Islamophobia is by no means confined to the 
working poor or the middle class, who have been misinformed about Islam and 
Muslims. It is especially true for the so-called educated elite. Discriminating policies 
like the ban of the hijab for certain professions, the ban of the niqab in public, bans 
of minarets and other laws restricting Muslim’s freedom of religion speak 
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volumes.”248 The rise of IS in Syria and Iraq as well as the images of extreme violence it 
promoted through its media, the flight of many European Muslims to join IS as foreign 
fighters, and finally the terrorist attacks carried out by IS supporters in Europe during 
2015–2018, are the key factors that have increased Islamophobia within European 
societies. Three states that combine all of the preceding factors are France, Belgium, and 
the UK. 
Starting with the Belgian case, Islam and the issue of Belgian Muslims issue has 
been at the forefront of public debate since 2015. At the beginning of that year, the 
Belgian authorities launched a campaign of raid to find individuals suspected of Islamic 
extremism. This practice of the Belgian police developed a climate of dread and 
insecurity among Belgian Muslims. The terrorist attacks in France in November 2015 
acted as a trigger for Islamophobia to erupt in Belgium. And this is explained by the 
sharp rise in Islamophobic attacks on Belgian Muslims after November 13 and the Paris 
attack. Between November 13 and December 16, 2015, a total of 47 episodes were 
reported against Muslims in Belgium, and mainly Muslim women who had a prominent 
Muslim appearance.249 As in the previous year, Islamophobia continued to increase 
throughout Belgium in 2016. On March 22, 2016, the attacks at Maalbeek metro station 
and Zaventem airport sparked a climate of hatred and anti-Muslim prejudice. The 
involvement of Belgian media and politicians, who turned against the Muslims, also 
shaped this climate.250 Finally, Islamophobic incidents were recorded in both in 2017 
and 2018.251 
Implementing the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act, which was a continuation 
of the previous PREVENT policy of 2005, made the situation even worse for British 
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Muslims. Under this law, it was possible to report to the police a person who was a 
suspected extremist. This parameter resulted in complaints against Muslims without 
evidence but based on prejudices and misconceptions.252 Muslims’ situation was fully 
reflected in a BBC poll in 2015; the results showed that because of prejudice against 
Islam, about half of British Muslims (46%) said it was challenging to live in the UK.253 
This prejudice against Muslims also prevails in finding work in the UK, where Muslims 
are less likely to be hired than whites even if they have the same qualifications and age. 
This phenomenon is described as the “Muslim penalty,” and 76% of Muslim men 
experience this phenomenon, while 65% of Muslim women do.254 2016 was a 
challenging year for the UK after the referendum on leaving the EU. The political 
campaign in support of Brexit was based mainly on issues against minorities and Islam. 
The following year, terrorist attacks sparked increased anti-Muslim sentiment,255 and 
attacks against Muslims rose sharply, from 47% in the previous year to 110%.256 
In 2015, the terrorist attacks on Charlie Hebdo headquarters and Paris marked 
France. These attacks also increased the already existing Islamophobia within French 
society, a country with the largest Muslim population in Europe. Furthermore, a 2016 
survey revealed that 25% of teens in France were Muslim. This percentage reveals that 
there is a large audience for jihadist propaganda in France, and since as teenagers, they 
are “hot-blooded.”257 Especially after the Paris attack, both the French authorities and the 
citizens turned against the Muslims, leading to the marginalization of the latter. French 
authorities have raised the issue of Islam in public debates as part of a series of raids on 
mosques and Muslim institutions to arrest extremists. However, also within French 
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society, Muslims have become victims of violence by their fellow citizens.258 According 
to Oliver Esteves’ review of research conducted by Collectif Contre l’Islamophobie en 
France (CCIF), in the first half of 2015, attacks on Muslims increased rapidly by 500%, 
with 75% of the victims being Muslim women due to their appearance.259 In the wake of 
the terrorist attacks in Paris, the French government declared a state of emergency. This 
regime strengthened the forces of the executive branch of the French authorities, which 
immediately targeted the Muslims. In 2016, the French authorities carried out more than 
4,000 raids against Muslim targets, of which only six were based on terror-related 
elements.260 In 2017, there was a decrease in physical attacks against Muslims compared 
to 2016; despite the decrease, there were 121 anti-Muslim attacks. Besides, the French 
authorities continued to oppress Muslims as they continued to target Muslim individuals 
and their institutions.261 
Finally, the policies pursued by the Western authorities towards the Muslims, in 
addition to the oppression, also resulted in their humiliation and making them feel out of 
place in the society in which they lived. A 2012 report by Human Rights Watch detailed 
the behavior of the French police towards Arabs in France. According to the report, the 
police used an ethnic profile when selecting the people to be subjected to security checks. 
In these checks, the police treated the citizens of Arab descent in a derogatory manner, 
using offensive language and racial defamation, while the police’s excessive use of force 
is not uncommon.262 This situation is confirmed by another study in 2009, which found 
that in France, Arabs were almost eight times more likely than whites to be stopped by 
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policemen for security checks.263 The aforementioned practices applied by the French 
police resulted in the Arabs living in France feeling humiliated and excluded from 
society.264 In 2016, the Defender of Rights institution conducted a survey in France, 
which showed that it was now 20 times more likely for the police to stop an Arab than a 
white person for a security check.265 This increase in French police checks on Arabs, 
which was about 2.5 times higher than in 2009, may have contributed to the terrorist 
attacks at Charlie Hebdo in January 2015, followed by the mass shootings and suicide 
bombings in Paris of November 2015, as well as the Nice attack on Bastille Day in July 
2016. Current anti-terrorism legislation in France allows the police to carry out security 
checks on people, bags, and vehicles, without having to show any apparent serious or 
imminent threat.266  
In addition to checks, police in France also intervene in matters of Islamic 
tradition, such as what a Muslim woman may or may not wear.267 For example, Lisa I. 
Carroll states that “[t]he French Administrative Court […] ruled that Muslim girls could 
remain in school and wear their headscarves, changed its rulings, and banned all 
‘ostentatious’ displays of religion. The ban was not limited to schools. Police in Nice, just 
one short month after the terrorist attacks on Bastille Day, ordered a woman to remove 
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her ‘burkini,’ as the press labeled modest minded beachwear mainly for observant 
Muslim women.”268 
D. SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY 
In order for propaganda to succeed, its purpose must be comprehensive and 
include all modern media.269 So in addition to the Internet, radio, banners, leaflets, and 
posters, the IS also uses magazines as a means of spreading its propaganda. The IS placed 
great emphasis on its magazines, designing them in great detail and sophistication, and 
this is because “magazines are instruments of power.”270 The IS published an online 
English-language magazine, as the official magazine of the group, but they changed its 
name after the fall of Dabiq. The IS published 15 issues of what was first called Dabiq 
between July 2014 and July 2016, and then 13 issues of the magazine under its second 
title Rumiyah, between September 2016 and September 2017.271 The analysis of the 
messages promoted by IS’ online magazine is vital to understanding the strategies 
implemented by the IS, and consequently, what its strategic goals were. Simultaneously, 
the comparison between the two versions of the magazine offers insight into the modus 
operandi of the IS over time, from the establishment of the Caliphate to the loss of 
territory. 
The analysis was carried out by coding the cover of each magazine. The 
magazine cover is the most valuable piece for any magazine.272 First, in today’s 
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digital environment where information passes quickly in front of the reader’s eyes,273 a 
magazine cover must be eye-catching to can gain his or her attention.274 Thus, most 
designers no longer put much information on covers, and instead highlight two or three 
crucial things about the magazine and its representation. As Sara Jerde explains “covers 
are a brand statement. They are to promote who you are and what you stand for.” 275 
Secondly, the IS used its magazines to promote and maintain its branding,276 and the 
magazine cover and its design reinforced the brand.277 How cleverly a cover is designed 
not only promotes the message the group wants to convey its audience through the 
Internet, but can help that message go viral. The Internet allows magazine covers to reach 
audiences farther away than ever before. Magazine covers now have their own URLs, 
enabling them to be continuously distributed on the Internet via sharing on Facebook, 
tweets, and retweets, and this process makes the cover viral.278 Nowadays, the cover is a 
statement on multiple levels, and it becomes what people associate with the cover’s 
message.279 For example, in an NBD survey, the phenomenon of an event becoming 
viral was observed mainly from its exposure on a magazine cover, since 80% of the 
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respondents had not read the article and were affected only by the cover.280 This is the 
trend that happens today with all the popular magazines in the Western world and IS 
followed this trend with its own magazine, designing its covers accordingly. 
According to the prevailing trends prevailing in modern cover design, to be 
effective, the cover does not have to contain a lot of information. So firstly, there are no 
more slogans, buzzwords, or graphics on their covers.281 And secondly, the design 
elements most critical for success are a) the masthead or title of the magazine, b) the 
main image on the cover, and c) the main cover line or anchorage text.282  
The covers of IS magazines, following the design patterns of popular Western 
magazines, did not have slogans, buzzwords, or graphics on their covers. This thesis 
chapter analyzes the covers by coding the strategies promoted by the main image and the 
main cover line of each cover of both versions of the magazine (Dabiq, Rumiyah). 
Afterward, the covers were categorized into three broad strategy types. Each cover image 
and main cover line were read and coded according to the strategy they advanced. For 
instance, a cover image depicting the IS capture of a new territory would be get the code 
as cover advanced the outbidding strategy. Cover images or cover lines that clearly 
advanced two strategies were granted with two codes. For the sake of parsimony and 
simplicity, each cover image or cover line got only one or two codes. For covers that 
included many elements, a judgment was made as to which codes represented the cover's 
dominant strategy. This judgment was done by comparing the cover image and the cover 
line to find out the common concept of these two, and in case of doubt, the final ranking 
was made after reading the article in the magazine that had the same topic as the cover. 
Finally, the magazine title, which is the third crucial element in the design of a periodical, 
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is analyzed in the context of IS strategies and compared with the results of the analysis of 
the other two elements of the cover. 
E. NUMERICAL OVERVIEW 
As already mentioned, IS chose two titles for its online magazine. For Dabiq’s 15 
cover images, three were coded as advancing the intimidation strategy, 11 as advancing 
the outbidding strategy, and eight as advancing the polarization strategy. Similarly, οf 
Dabiq’s 15 main cover lines, three were coded as advancing the intimidation strategy, 12 
as advancing the outbidding strategy, and eight as advancing the polarization strategy. 
For Rumiyah’s 13 cover images, ten were coded as advancing the intimidation strategy, 
four as advancing the outbidding strategy, and two as advancing the polarization strategy. 
In a similar way, οf Rumiyah’s seven main cover lines, five were coded as advancing the 
intimidation strategy, four as advancing the outbidding strategy, and 2two as advancing 
the polarization strategy. The covers of each of these magazines and their elements that 
were used in this analysis are provided in Appendix A and Appendix B, respectively. 
F. INITIAL OBSERVATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
The comparison between Dabiq and Rumiyah covers reveals changes in the IS 
strategies and offers valuable insights about the group during the period in which these 
magazines were published. Remarkable initial findings include: 
1. Masthead or Title of the Magazine 
The choice of the magazine titles reflects the core of the IS strategies at the time 
of the magazine’s publication. Besides, these two titles had a significant interpretation. A 
few days after announcing that it had re-established the Caliphate, the group chose the 
title Dabiq for the magazine it published. Dabiq, according to radical Islamist 
eschatology, is the area where the End of Days battle will be fought.283 The approach to 
the title was an apocalyptic promise of the IS leadership for Ummah and its life in the 
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Caliphate.284 As stated by al-Ḥayāt Media Center, the publisher of Dabiq: “The mission 
[…] is to convey a message of the Islamic State in different languages with the aim of 
unifying the Muslims under one flag.”285 Hence, the strategy supported by this title is 
outbidding. The next title given to the magazine was Rumiyah, which means Rome in 
Arabic, and is inspired by a hadith in which the Prophet Muhammad ordered the Muslims 
to first conquer Constantinople, then Rome.286 The title reflects the change in the group’s 
strategy, which after the loss of territory and according to the tactical situation in Syria 
and Iraq, adopted an aggressive approach, thus changing its strategy to intimidate 
opponents. 
2. Comparative Analysis 
The comparative analysis of the cover image and the main cover line has the same 
effect on supporting a particular strategy, except in one case where the main cover line 
adds a new strategy (Dabiq Issue #6). So from this point on, in this paper, the cover 
analysis includes both cover elements. The elements of this comparative analysis are 
illustrated in Appendix C. 
3. Analysis of the Design of the Covers  
The analysis of the design of the covers of the magazine also reflects the situation 
of IS in the period 2014–2017. Dabiq, with a sophisticated Western cover design showed 
the acme of the group. Ιmportant events such as the loss of the town of Dabiq, the deaths 
of the two of its most senior media strategists⎯Abu Muhammad al-’Adnani and al-
Furqan⎯resulted in a drop in the quality of the magazine’s covers, which had changed its 
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name at that period.287 That is why in the analysis of the covers, those for Rumiyah, after 
the sixth issue, had a similar quality to the Dabiq covers. 
4. Analysis of the Covers  
The analysis of the covers of the magazine reveals that the IS used the group’s 
official magazine to promote the strategies analyzed in this chapter. Depending on the 
IS’s tactical situation at the time the magazine was published, the group focused on a 
specific strategy that best served the group. 
a. Dabiq 
The analysis of Dabiq covers shows that the IS when it was at the peak of its 
power, pursued as primary goal the legitimization of the Caliphate. As Miron Lakomy 
points out, the “magazine attempted to present the IS as the ‘wonderland’ for 
Ummah.”288 That is why the outbidding strategy was the one that dominated the largest 
percentage of the covers. The IS employed soft power through the outbidding strategy, 
promoting its ability to provide social services and govern the Caliphate. Moreover, the 
group’s propaganda aimed to secure a position of dominance in the jihadist movement. 
The same conclusions were reached by Celine Marie Novenario after her analysis of the 
magazine, where she states that “[f]indings reveal that Al Qaeda consistently employs 
attrition to compel changes in the West’s policy and behavior, while the Islamic State has 
shifted from intimidating populations to outbidding competing groups to solidify its 
claim to the Caliphate.”289 Shahira Fahmy, in her research on the visual narratives of the 
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Dabiq magazine, also emphasizes that the group “focused primarily on visuals 
emphasizing its attractiveness and legitimacy.”290 
Polarization was the strategy identified by the second largest percentage of 
magazine covers. The Dabiq period is characterized by a more sophisticated design on 
the covers to support multiple strategies.291 Polarization is a long-term strategy, whereby 
IS wanted to invest in future generations of followers. For this reason, IS propaganda 
presented messages that demonstrate the oppression of Muslims within the Arab world by 
corrupt regimes or in the rest of the world by the authorities and societies in which they 
live. Finally, the IS advanced intimidation as its third priority to subdue populations 
within its territories. In an analysis made by Lakomy of the magazine’s gruesome 
materials and their role in the IS propaganda aimed at intimidation, he concludes that 
they had a secondary importance.292 
b. Rumiyah 
Rumiyah effectively abandoned its predecessor’s sophisticated narration, and it 
“chose to attach greater importance to inciting them to get involved in jihad against the 
infidels.”293 This shift was understandable as al-Baghdadi's strategic situation 
deteriorated significantly in 2016 and 2017. In addition, IS supporters' opportunities to 
move to the remaining areas controlled by the group in Iraq and Syria were minimized. 
Thus, instead, the group decided on the promotion of its agenda through intimidation. 
The consequence of the factors just described is that in this form of the magazine, the IS 
gave much less importance to its outbidding and polarization strategies. 
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IV. THE ISLAMIC STATE AND SOCIAL MEDIA 
The leaders of the Islamic State had understood from the beginning that the most 
essential part of the dynamics of their propaganda was its dissemination through the 
Internet. The full exploitation of the Internet spectrum and its possibilities would ensure 
the desired results for the group. For this reason, the IS took advantage of every latest 
Western technology as well as recruiting specialized personnel to use it accordingly. For 
example, Bari Atwan, in an interview with David Patrikarakos, explained that the group 
“made use of the latest Western invention⎯the Internet⎯and managing to recruit 
everyone from experts in IT […] to graduates from highly reputed Western universities to 
put themselves on the media, political, and military map.”294 
A. THE WEB AND SECURE BROWSERS 
Web 2.0, or simply Web, is the interactive web on which Internet users can now 
interact with each other, exchange information, and shape the content of a web page. The 
web is divided into three areas, “Surface Web,” “Deep Web,” and “Dark Web.” The first 
domain concerns the average user, accounts for 4% of the web, and has the most 
information circulating on the Internet. The deep web is where data is not retrieved from 
standard web search engines. The data is stored in other layers where they are not 
accessible by the majority of users. The last area, the dark web, consists of encrypted 
sites, which can be accessed only by those who know where to find these sites and how to 
log in to them. Most of these sites are involved in criminal activities, and it is an area that 
also favors the development of jihadist networks.295 
Another component is the Decentralized Web (DWeb), which has almost the 
same properties as the ordinary web, except for the existence of “middle man.”296 This 
 
294 David Patrikarakos, War in 140 Characters: How Social Media Is Reshaping Conflict in the 
Twenty-First Century, 1st ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2017), 208. 
295 Nance and Sampson, Hacking ISIS: How to Destroy the Cyber Jihad, 14. 
296 Loránd Bodó, “Decentralised Terrorism: The Next Big Step for the so-Called Islamic State (IS)?,” 
VOX - Pol, December 12, 2018, https://www.voxpol.eu/decentralised-terrorism-the-next-big-step-for-the-
so-called-islamic-state-is/. 
60 
term refers to the condition that allows users to communicate with each other in the 
DWeb, with no large intermediaries or services that control and own the users’ personal 
data. Loránd Bodó highlights that “the decentrali[z]ed web reverses the current data-
ownership model, in which users will take back full control over their data. 
Decentrali[z]ed models include peer-to-peer (P2P) and various other distributed 
systems.”297 Meanwhile, Peter King points out that “[t]he decentrali[z]ed web gives 
users more say about where their data is stored, avoiding reliance on the big Internet 
gatekeepers like Google and Facebook. It is built on network infrastructure that is more 
resilient against censorship and surveillance and poses additional challenges to law 
enforcement agencies, restricting their ability to remove content.”298 
Navigation on all forms of the web is done through browsers. Using browsers for 
IS was vital to carrying out activities on the Internet. For Web, the group used all the 
well-known browsers such as Firefox, Google Chrome, and Safari, among others. These 
browsers made it very easy for the group and its supporters to use, but also made them 
vulnerable to security authorities’ detection. In order to protect and maintain its 
anonymity from surveillance by the authorities through common browsers, the IS moved 
in two directions. Initially, the group used these browsers simultaneously with virtual 
private networks (VPN), which have the ability to hide the real location of the user and, 
at the same time, present a random wrong location. The tech-savvy jihadists then 
proceeded to use the anonymous browsers as an alternative, most of which contained or 
were compatible with VPN programs. The Opera Browser, which contains an ad-blocker 
and free VPN service, was a jihadist-approved browser.299 Ghost VPN is a program that, 
combined with the anonymous browser Third Party Onion Routing (TOR), makes it 
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extremely difficult to detect the user’s IP address. Anonymous browsers such as TOR are 
required to gain access to the dark web.300 Other web browsers that function like TOR 
are I2P, Subgraphs OS, Freepto, and Freenet.301 Finally, an additional measure for the 
jihadist network’s cyber-security was to start their computers from an external source (a 
CD or flash drive) so that no traces were left on the hard disk. The program proposed by 
IS for this process was The Amnesic Incognito Live System (TAILS), which has TOR 
preinstalled and also provides encryption tools for files, folders, messages, and emails.302 
B. SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS AND APPLICATIONS 
The Islamic State’s online campaign was implemented through several social 
media platforms and applications. Social media refers to how groups of people interact 
and communicate through online communities. Social media appear in various forms, 
such as Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter. Social media allows interactions between users 
who create virtual communities and networks to exchange and share information and 
ideas within those networks seamlessly. Applications are small computer programs, 
mainly for the smartphone or tablet that can perform a specific task or a small number of 
related tasks. As Marco Arnaboldi and Lorenzo Vidino highlight that social media 
platforms and applications are “easy to use and cheap, [and] they offer unlimited 
opportunities to share content and, as a consequence, are difficult to control: these are the 
strengths that social networks offer to jihadists.”303 
1. YouTube 
YouTube is a site that allows its users to share, store, search, and play digital 
videos and digital movies. It was founded in 2005 and today operates as a subsidiary 
platform of Google. Although used by other terrorist organizations in the past, the 
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platform was massively exploited by Islamist fighters in the early days of the war in 
Syria, so much so that the war took the nickname “YouTube War.”304 While the 
campaign with the videos of the beheadings that the IS had launched was characterized 
by Hanna Kozlowska of the New York Times as “a modern guillotine execution spectacle, 
with YouTube as the town square.”305 
The platform had a function that strengthened radicalization; without the IS 
having to intervene in this process, all the group had to do was upload as much 
propaganda material as possible. YouTube had developed a powerful artificial 
intelligence system that learns what the user likes to watch on the platform and 
continuously feeds him or her similar video content. This system with the process of 
matching the content of the videos and suggesting appropriate videos creates for the user 
his or her own “ecosystem.”306 If the user’s ecosystem consists of IS videos, he will 
likely become radicalized and become an ardent supporter of the group. Something 
similar happened in Brazil, where the unrealistic rise of the far-right on the platform was 
due to the “ecosystem of hate,” which had been created by YouTube’s recommendation 
engine.307 
2. Twitter 
Twitter is a social networking site that allows its users to send and read text 
messages (up to 280 characters) called tweets. Offline users can also read messages, but 
only those logged-in can post. The Islamic State used Twitter more than any other social 
media platform in its early days as a Caliphate,308 until the platform opposed the violent 
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posts of the group and gradually closed a large number of accounts that belonged to the 
IS or its supporters.309 Until then, the group took full advantage of the platform to spread 
its propaganda and message about the establishment of the Caliphate to Muslims 
everywhere. The group and its supporters even used the platform to fight rival jihadist 
groups.310 The extent of the IS’s exploitation of the platform was reflected in the 
numbers that emerged from various studies concerning the use of Twitter by the group. 
For example, from September through December 2014, Berger and Morgan, in their 
study, estimated that at least 46,000 Twitter accounts were used by IS supporters.311 
Also, Singer and Brooking highlight that “in 2014, at its peak, the ISIS propaganda 
machine would span at least 70000 Twitter accounts, a chaotic mix of professional media 
operatives, fanboys, sockpuppets, and bots.”312 
The media staff of IS had adopted a series of tactics to be able to use the platform 
effectively. All the specialized staff on media and online marketing recruited by the 
group contributed to the design of these tactics, and their basic idea was to take full 
advantage of all the features provided by the platform itself.313  The first tactic they 
applied was the multifaceted use of the hashtag and its functions. The hashtag has 
become a channel of online communication in critical situations in order to share 
important information. The hashtag is built using the “#” symbol at the beginning and 
then the keyword is added. As explained by Tim Highfield, that hashtag is “a common 
marker that allows social media users to find relevant details among the wider coverage 
of the unfolding events, the hashtag acting as an unstructured and automated aggregator 
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of information.”314 The hashtag on Twitter started as a reference point for the 
transmission of information about the fires in California in 2007, and since then, in each 
crisis, there have been similar hashtags that Twitter users enter to search for information 
related to the events of the crisis. The earthquake in Haiti in 2010 and the terrorist attack 
in Norway in the same year are, for example, events that generated hashtags for the 
transmission of information about these events.315     
The group launched a hashtag campaign in which the IS users uploaded thousands 
of specific hashtags in order for these hashtags to appear in the most popular hashtags of 
the account @ActiveHashtags. The acquisition of this Twitter account by IS was aimed at 
the Arab world, who came to this account to check the current events and the current top 
trending hashtags.316 The other side of the hashtag exploitation was based on the “brand 
sharing” strategy to distribute the jihadist propaganda material. In this case, when the 
group’s material was published, the IS media operators added hashtags from a well-
known event or person in order to distribute the material to those who follow these 
hashtags and who were not supporters of the group. So the group promoted its 
propaganda to as many as it could. For example, the jihadists used the hashtag #Louis in 
a video they uploaded in 2014, inadvertently forcing Grand Prix fans to expose 
themselves to IS to the IS propaganda content.317 Similarly, the jihadists used pop 
superstar Justin Bieber’s hashtag to exploit his 74 million followers, and inadvertently or 
voluntarily, make them contribute to the spread of the Caliphate’s name and message.318 
The second tactic applied by IS was its creation of an Arabic-language Twitter 
app called The Dawn of Glad Tidings, or just Dawn. The application, an official IS 
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product promoted by its top users, was advertised as working to keep Islamic State 
followers informed on the latest news about the group and its operations.319 The Dawn 
application enabled IS media operators to post whatever tweet they wanted in the 
accounts of all those who had signed up for the application. The tweets shared by the IS 
headquarters operated as disseminators and contained mainly real-time news from the 
battlefield, sermons by the group leadership, photographs of battles, and equipment.320  
Finally, the IS innovated a reliable tactic by opting “for decentralized 
crowdsourcing, in-house designed apps and bots, and hashtag hacking.”321 With this 
tactic, IS had created a multi-tiered network among its supporters, whose mission was to 
strengthen the group’s presence on Twitter. The crowdsourcing tactic followed a well-
designed pattern: “After being posted and authenticated by official ISIS members, a 
second-tier group of several dozen online activists would retweet the link with a hashtag, 
then retweet each other’s tweets and write new tweets, all using the same hashtag. Other 
activists would upload the release to multiple platforms, so that it could be found even 
when Internet providers pulled the content down. [A] third tier…would repeat the process 
on a larger scale.”322 Τhis continuous posting and re-posting process created what is 
called a Twitter storm, “where hundreds of tweets with consistent hashtags at coordinated 
times cross the threshold that would trigger trending alerts, thereby exposing such tweet 
to a wider audience and generating more activity.”323 
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3. Telegram 
The Telegram social media application became the most reliable medium for the 
IS to upload any relevant videos, journals, memes, and pictures.324 Telegram is an online 
messaging application that works similarly to popular messaging apps such as WhatsApp, 
Viber, and Facebook Messenger.325 According to the app’s creators, Nikolai and Pavel 
Durov, Telegram is the fastest and safest app, and it is almost impossible to penetrate or 
eavesdrop on private conversations. Initially, the Telegram platform was designed to 
provide a secure and private messaging platform to protect users in authoritarian regimes 
from being monitored by the authorities. But eventually, Telegram ended up becoming 
the jihadists’ favorite platform.326 The security protocols that followed and the 
advantages provided by the platform led the web team of IS to take full advantage of 
Telegram and use it according to the group’s intended goal. 
First of all, the application administrators do not follow strict security protocols 
regarding their users’ content and show a relative tolerance. Unlike other applications 
that directly block such accounts, they do not quickly stop accounts that circulate material 
of the IS. Second, the other advantage of the app is that it provides users four different 
communication options. Telegram users can use direct one-to-one communications with 
secret chats and voice calls, which are secret and protected with a secure algorithm. Also, 
they can create groups and supergroups that can have up to 200,000 members and 
channels that broadcast to an unlimited number of users.327 The IS used these encrypted 
modes of communication to succeed in recruiting new members, communicating with the 
group’s supporters, and coordinating and guiding jihadists to carry out terrorist attacks in 
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Europe.328 For example, the French jihadist Rachid Kassim used his Telegram channel 
“Sabre de la Lumière” in order to recruit other youth to carry out terrorist attacks in his 
country.329 Using Telegram, the IS also took responsibility for Europe’s attacks and 
celebrated the attacks with its followers.330 
A third advantage is that the application is effortless to use since it has easy 
registration, it can work either on a mobile phone or PC, and its mode of operation is in 
many respects the same as that of other known applications (e.g., WhatsApp, Twitter).331 
Telegram also enables its users to use the “self-destruct option” when sending a message, 
by which the message self-destructs when read by the recipient.332 Finally, as Ahmet 
Yayla and Anne Speckhard point out, “another important feature of Telegram is being 
able to search the channels posts, group messages, individual messages or any kind of 
communications or posts in one’s account. This feature is available for both cell phone 
applications and the Web-based Telegram interface making it possible to reach any 
content by simply searching. This basically makes Telegram one of the largest free ISIS 
databases available.”333 Thus, it constitutes a genuine IS library of both old (archived) 
and new material. The contents of this material can be ideological, operational (tutorials, 
anonymity awareness, fundraising), and declaratory (claims of terrorist attacks in 
particular).334 
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4. DWeb Platforms  
IS started investigating DWeb for use in 2014, following the massive shutdown of 
its Twitter accounts. In the beginning, the group experimented with three low-profile 
decentralized platforms⎯Friendica, Quitter, and Diaspora.335 On the first two platforms, 
the group’s accounts were deleted within the first few days, while in Diaspora, the 
accounts survived the longest, until the group used the platform to spread a video of the 
beheading of a Western prisoner. Immediately after the video release, the IS accounts 
were shut down on this platform as well.336 The return of IS media operators to 
decentralized platforms came when the group saw 3,000 of their accounts deactivated 
overnight on Telegram in December 2018.337 This time the group tried DWeb services 
Riot, ZeroNet, RocketChat, and, most recently, Minds.338 Although DWeb platforms 
feature resilience and provide the group with the advantage of being able to network 
through it to communicate with its supporters and then share its material, at the same 
time, these platforms have a significant drawback. These platforms have limited 
capabilities to expand the number of users, as they cannot support a network with 
multiple users; for example, the RocketChat server run by IS is currently only capable of 
reaching about 1,000 users.339 For this reason, and once the IS media operatives and 
supporters have found a way to survive in the Telegram app,340 experts agree that the 
group does not currently appear willing to leave the platform, and the experiments on 
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DWeb were mainly to have ready back-up solutions in case Telegram manages to banish 
them completely in the future.  
5. Smaller Web Platforms 
According to experts, the IS chooses to use smaller web platforms that meet most 
of the following criteria, so that the exploitation of these platforms will benefit the group. 
These criteria are security, stability, usability, and audience reach.341 Security as a 
selection criterion means the platform must have end-to-end encryption to meet high-
security standards and provide the maximum possible operational security (OPSEC) for 
IS media operators and users of the platform. Stability as a selection criterion refers to 
whether the platform will harass the group on the pages and posts that it will upload to 
the platform following some security protocols for extremist content. Usability as a 
criterion refers to how easy it is to install the application, the registration process on the 
platform, and how easy it is to use it daily. The last criterion considered is the platform’s 
ability to reach a new audience and what size audience it can support.342 
Tech Against Terrorism has researched the activity of terrorist groups, especially 
that of the IS, on the Internet. To conduct the research, Tech Against Terrorism collected 
more than 45,000 URLs, which were links to more than 330 platforms that contained 
terrorist material for the period between 2015 and 2018. Although this number is only 
part of all URLs related to terrorism, it is safe to draw conclusions from the results of 
their research. The first conclusion is that terrorist groups make extensive use of small- 
and micro-platforms, especially after being excluded from the larger platforms. For 
example, out of the top 50 most used platforms identified in the research data, half of 
them are small- or micro-platforms.343 A second conclusion is that terrorists make 
extensive use of file-sharing sites and other cloud storage services to be able first to 
preserve and then share the material they have collected or created up to that time, while 
avoiding law enforcement. Research has shown that 44% of the top 50 most used 
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platforms are platforms with the aforementioned features, and mainly the eight discussed 
in the following paragraph: dump.to, addpost.it, t.co, archive.is, archive.org, bit.ly, 
Justpaste.it, and shortwiki.org.344  
The Justpaste.it platform, which is also considered an anonymous sharing portal, 
acts as an online “bulletin board” but offers anonymity since it does not require 
registration and provides the ability to use passwords and encryption. The platform also 
works with low-speed Internet, which favors using it in the Middle East, where the 
Internet is unstable and low speed. Also, due to the lack of ads on its page, it favors right-
to-left Arabic writing. These qualities of the platform made it sought after in jihadist 
circles and the world of crime since anyone can “pin” anything he or she wants on this 
board, from a note, video, photo, or text with any content. The IS used this “digital 
board” to upload battlefield reports, photos of violent deaths, beheadings, and links to the 
group’s fans to videos or pages removed from known applications. As Haroon K. Ullah 
points out about Justpaste.it, it is “a fast run-and-gun system, completely anonymous, 
easier to use than most blogs, and nowhere near as heavily patrolled by content monitors 
as the big names.”345 Moreover, the anonymous sharing portals, such as Justpaste.it, 
Sendvid.com, Dump, and the popular in the Middle East Top4top.net,346 acted as black 
boxes for IS propaganda content, helping the group “to sustain high-intensity information 
flows and maintain global communication channels. The emergence of these portals has 
fundamentally changed the way ISIS distributes its propaganda globally.”347 
6. Shortlinks and URLs  
Shortlinks convert a long and unwieldy weblink into a convenient short Uniform 
Resource Locator (URL). Some of the most used shortlinks are Twitter’s t.co, Google’s 
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goo.gl, bit.ly, and WordPress’s wp.me. Most of the time, the new small URL retains the 
original link’s address; so, if the user clicks on it, it goes to the page of the original link. 
For example, a user may click on a shortlink on Twitter and be redirected to a YouTube 
page.348 The virtual community of IS sympathizers disseminates URLs widely to 
preserve and expand its networks and online propaganda.349 It was an action to foster 
resilience against the various platforms’ measures to remove jihadist material from their 
pages.350 
7. Encrypted Applications  
End-to-end encrypted messaging applications have played a key role in recruiting, 
planning, and coordinating IS attacks.351 The group and its followers used a wide range 
of these applications, which provided relative security during communication, and most 
had a free installation on their mobile phones or PCs.352 Some of these applications are 
Signal, Wickr, Surespot, Threema, Silent Circle, Viber, and Skype.353 Although 
WhatsApp had the same end-to-end encryption protocol as Signal, IS supporters did not 
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trust it because Facebook purchased it in 2013.354 Another favorable message platform 
was Kik messenger, which appears to be used for illegal activities.355 The IS also used 
applications such as TrueCrypt for encrypting and tracking files.356 Additionally, for 
encryption, the group used the Zello application that allows users to establish channels to 
share encrypted audio messages.357 
8. Cryptocurrencies 
The IS entered the world of cryptocurrencies to avoid the obstacles posed by the 
Western authorities. Cryptocurrencies have allowed jihadists to move funds across 
borders while avoiding regular banking scrutiny.358 At the end of 2017, IS sympathizers 
launched campaigns to fund the Islamic State through cryptocurrency donations (Bitcoin 
and the more anonymous Zcash). These campaigns were conducted on IS affiliate sites as 
well as on chat platforms (e.g., Telegram) to finance the group.359 
C. ADOPTED PATTERNS OF SOCIAL MEDIA USE 
At the beginning of the IS activity on the Internet, the IS tech group operated 
mainly within the limits of each application separately, trying to exploit each 
application’s features fully. So, through the analysis that was done in the applications 
used by the group, some micro-patterns adopted by the IS for each application emerged. 
After the gradual removal of propaganda material and the shutdown of IS accounts by the 
administrators of the most popular platforms and applications, the group changed course, 
 
354 Shehabat, Mitew, and Alzoubi, “Encrypted Jihad,” 33. 
355 Rita Katz, “As the Caliphate Crumbles, a Female American ISIS Member Makes a Pitch for 
Redemption,” SITE Intelligence Group, 2019, 
https://news.siteintelgroup.com/blog/index.php/categories/jihad/entry/439-as-the-caliphate-crumbles,-an-
american-isis-member-makes-a-pitch-for-redemption; Atwan, Islamic State: The Digital Caliphate, 18. 
356 Nance and Sampson, Hacking ISIS: How to Destroy the Cyber Jihad, 71. 
357 Weiss and Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror, 176–77. 
358 Nathaniel Popper, “Terrorists Turn to Bitcoin for Funding, and They’re Learning Fast,” The New 
York Times, August 18, 2019, sec. Technology, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/18/technology/terrorists-bitcoin.html. 
359 European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation, “Internet Organised Crime Threat 
Assessment (IOCTA) 2018,” 53. 
73 
adopting two different patterns that connect a vast range of platforms across the surface 
and the dark web. As a result, the IS created a large and complex information network.360 
The first pattern concerns the existence and preservation of IS propaganda 
material on the web so that it is available to its supporters and is not in danger of being 
destroyed by the authorities. The group media operators adopted the following practice to 
design this pattern. They uploaded the group material on several platforms, either file-
sharing or archive types. For example, in 2019, the Institute of Strategic Dialogue (ISD) 
discovered one of the largest online jihadist material collections belonging to the IS. This 
digital library, which ISD called the Caliphate Cache, contains more than 90,000 unique 
items and has about 10,000 visits per month.361 The group then used encryption message 
apps, mainly Telegram, to distribute its material to the group’s followers, sending them 
links to these platforms in URL format.362 This pattern has a significant advantage, but 
also a drawback. It makes the authorities’ task even more challenging to eradicate 
terrorist propaganda from the Internet, but it is not easy to apply by the public, so it is 
more limited and more personalized. So, the group’s abandonment of widespread social 
media use has removed the IS’s ability to make a viral issue. 
The second pattern aims to mitigate the disadvantage of the first one, helping the 
group make some specific events go viral and dominate the media worldwide. The 
terrorist attack on two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand, where 50 people were 
killed, is a representative case study of the pattern that terrorists now use to make their 
actions go viral and at the same time to share their propaganda and ideology.363 Although 
the perpetrator subscribed to far-right terrorism, the pattern he used was similar to that of 
the IS, and can safely help us draw conclusions about the exploitation of social media by 
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terrorists.364 This pattern uses well-known large platforms to act as “beacons” to first 
upload the material to them and then, in collaboration with smaller file-sharing platforms, 
directs users to scatter the URL of the propaganda material on as many platforms as 
possible.365 The second stage of the pattern essentially acts as an amplifier of the 
propaganda material to reach as broad an audience as possible by bypassing the safety 
measures implemented by the social media platforms against extremist material of any 
kind (image, video, text). The network of supporters of the terrorist group amplified 
terrorist propaganda material by re-sharing the link and re-uploading the material every 
time it was shut down from the platforms. Both of these processes take place on as many 
platforms as possible and as quickly as possible so that terrorists can prevent 
countermeasures from the authorities and the platform administrators.366 
Analyzing the attack on the mosques, in Christchurch, in contrast to the stages of 
the pattern analyzed previously, the following actions can be distinguished by the 
perpetrator per stage: 
1. Before the Attack 
a) The perpetrator uploaded his manifesto, titled “The Great Replacement,” 
on several smaller file-sharing platforms such as ZippyShare, MediaFire, Mega.nz., and 
Solidfiles. ISIS has previously used these platforms.367  
b) About ten minutes before attacking the first mosque (Linwood Mosque), 
the terrorist, following the “beacon” tactic, uploaded to large social media platforms 
(Facebook, Twitter, and 8chan) links from his manifesto from the aforementioned file-
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sharing content storage sites, along with a message about his motivation for the 
attacks.368 
2. During the Attack 
The perpetrator live-streamed the attack through his Facebook profile, while at the 
same time, he had uploaded a link to his profile on 8chan so that those interested could 
watch the attack live.369 The live video of the attacks was viewed 4,000 times before it 
was removed.370 
3. Following the Attack 
a) The terrorist uploaded the video of the attack on LiveLeak, YouTube, 
Kiwifarms, BitChute, and also as a downloadable file on Torrentz. Moreover, users of 
these media platforms re-shared links to the video on 8chan, Reddit, and Facebook. 
Additionally, the terrorist’s manifesto appeared on 8chan, Reddit, and Scribd.371 
b) British news media sites (The Daily Mail, The Mirror, and The Sun) 
uploaded the terrorist’s manifesto or the video of the attack on their webpages, 
contributing to these materials going viral.372  
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c) Versions of his social media accounts (Facebook, Twitter) and his 
manifesto surfaced on archive content sites (Archive Today, and Internet Archive’s 
Wayback Machine).373   
The “beacon” pattern in the attack in New Zealand is shown in numbers through 
the data provided by the major social media platforms in their attempt to eliminate any 
file, video, or account related to the attack. For example, YouTube said it “removed tens 
of thousands of videos and terminated hundreds of accounts created to promote or glorify 
the shooter.”374 While at the same time Facebook stated that “in the first 24 hours [it] 
removed 1.5 million videos of the attack globally, of which over 1.2 million were 
blocked at upload.”375 Similarly, Facebook VP and Deputy General Counsel Chris 
Sonderby stated that the security staff of popular social media worked tirelessly to 
eliminate any trace of the attack on Facebook pages.376 Finally, this pattern was also 
adopted by the perpetrator of the terrorist attack in Halle, Germany.377 And in this case, 
as the terrorist broadcast the attack live, it became less widespread on the Internet due to 
the measures taken by the social media platforms.378 
D. NEXT BIG THING  
The study of the IS’s patterns and the platforms that IS uses shows that the group 
has found a way to store and share its propaganda. The group’s problem is that it is 
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looking for the next platform, which will help the Islamic State’s actions to go viral. The 
platforms that seem to be the jihadists’ next targets are Instagram and TikTok. 
1. Instagram 
Instagram is a popular mobile social application and at the same time a social 
networking service, which allows users to download and share photos and videos, while 
it also has a variety of other user-friendly tools. Although it is not a recent application, in 
recent years its use as a means of spreading misinformation has come to the fore. 
According to experts, Instagram is the next platform that will be used to spread extremist 
ideologies.379 Jonathan Albright, as he quoted in The Atlantic article, points out that 
“Instagram [is] perhaps the most effective platform to spread misinformation, [because it] 
has the power of Twitter to broadcast out, but the infrastructure of Facebook supporting 
it.”380 The application is already being exploited by far-right extremists to share material 
and express their anti-Jewish hatred.381 Also, unlike other popular social media 
applications that have blocked far-right users’ posts and accounts, the extremists on 
Instagram have found a way to bypass security protocols and continue to operate 
undisturbed.382 Similar to far-right terrorists, IS jihadists seem to be turning their 
attention to Instagram.383 Besides, Instagram has a feature that makes it particularly 
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attractive to the IS. The majority of the application’s users are young people, who are 
more vulnerable to IS propaganda and possible recruitment.384 
2. TikTok 
The TikTok app is currently the fastest growing social media platform, especially 
in the quarantine imposed across many states due to the pandemic. Although TikTok was 
introduced to the world in 2017, the application already has more than two billion 
downloads, ranking it in seventh place for the most downloaded application of the 
decade. The application is very easy to use and provides users with the ability to upload 
and watch short lip-synced videos.385 The massive creation of profiles on TikTok by its 
users also attracted extremist circles, where they found their new place to distribute their 
propaganda material. This particular platform has some features that make it particularly 
appealing to extremists. First, it is based in China, sparing the company immediate 
pressure from Western authorities on the policies it should implement regarding the 
content of the users’ posts. Second, the way the app works, as well as the way posts are 
shared among users, makes it impossible to report an extreme video and download it 
directly from the base of the app. As Sophie Lewis explains,  
TikTok’s unique algorithm and content recommendation system allow 
content to spread more easily than other apps. Contrary to other platforms 
like Facebook and Instagram, which mainly focus on people you follow, 
TikTok’s main feed, the ‘For You Page,’ gives users viral content 
regardless of whether or not they follow the account positing it — making 
it very difficult to avoid unwanted footage.386  
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For example, the administrators of the application took several days to delete a 
post uploaded to the platform and showed the suicide of a man live.387 
In addition, extremists have found a way to bypass the automated method of 
detecting extremist material, which TikTok has as a security measure to detect 
inappropriate material posted on its pages. As Weimann, an expert in the online terrorist 
activities, has observed, detecting extremist material on TikTok is extremely difficult, as 
users do not use common keywords but a combination of codes, symbols, and hashtags. 
Finally, this application targets young people; for example, 41% of its users are aged 16 
to 24.388 For extremists, this age group is not only especially vulnerable to in the appeal 
of extreme ideologies, but also represents the fighters of the future. The IS has already 
begun to make its appearance in the application, uploading propaganda material and 
targeting young audiences who are the primary users of TikTok, according to what 
Weimann has emphasized.389 
E. INNOVATOR OR ADOPTER 
The Islamic State’s rapid spread on the web, combined with its land conquests in 
Syria and Iraq, has brought to the fore the debate over how innovative the group was in 
its use of social media and how sophisticated its media campaign was. But a closer look 
at the IS’s tactics in exploiting the Internet makes clear that the group seems to have 
followed other models, tailored to its own requirements, rather than the group discovering 
new ways to exploit the Internet. In addition, technological developments on the Internet 
and in applications have helped the IS to impose its plan for the dissemination of its 
propaganda. Brooking and Singer emphasize this by saying that “[w]hile the Islamic 
State has shown savvy in its use of social media, it is the technology itself—not any 
unique genius on the part of the jihadists—that lies at the heart of the group’s 
 
387 Sian Elvin, “TikTok Can’t Stop People Uploading Video of Man Shooting Himself Dead,” Metro 
(blog), September 8, 2020, https://metro.co.uk/2020/09/08/tiktok-cant-stop-people-uploading-video-of-
man-shooting-himself-dead-13237704/. 
388 Reich, “TikTok Rife with Racist, Antisemitic Content Aimed at Children – Study.” 
389 Sam Shead, “TikTok Used by Islamic State to Spread Propaganda Videos,” BBC News, October 
22, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-50138740. 
80 
disruptive power and outsize success. Other groups will follow.”390 Following are 
some of the models that the group used as a guide to design their own media 
campaign. 
The IS initially looked for models that had already been successfully 
implemented by its parent organization, al Qaeda, and that group’s other affiliated 
terrorist organizations. First, al Qaeda created a Windows encryption program that 
helped jihadists encrypt their emails. The program, known as “Mujahideen Secrets,” was 
upgraded in 2008 while al Qaeda, through Inspire magazine, gave its fighters instructions 
on how to use the program.391 Edward Snowden’s revelations that the U.S. National 
Security Administration collaborated with several software companies to gather 
information on application users392  made jihadists particularly distrusting of mainstream 
applications and prompted them to create their own. Al Qaeda firstly created the Tashfeer 
al-Jawwal, Asrar al-Dardashah, and Amn al-Mujahid programs for Android and 
Windows mobile phones, which provided encryption based on the Twofish cryptography 
application. Likewise, the IS later created its own applications.393 Moreover, the 
Somalia-based cell of the al Qaeda, al-Shabaab, even before the IS declared the 
Caliphate, had used al Qaeda online platforms to disperse its propaganda and gain new 
supporters and financial support.394 In 2013, al-Shabaab was also the first jihadist group 
to broadcast live the attack on Westgate Mall in Nairobi. The group used Twitter to 
produce a live feed through a social media platform of an ongoing terrorist attack.395 
Finally, the use of YouTube by IS was inspired by al Qaeda’s practices in using the 
platform. The YouTube-based jihadist channels broadcasted threats and texts from the 
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Quran, promoted violent acts, and stressed Muslims’ suffering from the Western military 
forces.396 
Al Qaeda’s successful use of the Internet and social media, however, was not the 
only model examined by jihadists. The widespread and well-designed use of the Internet 
by U.S. President Barack Obama and his staff was the determining factor that led him to 
the presidency. Just as then-Senator John F. Kennedy took advantage of television as the 
emerging medium for his campaign, so did Obama with the Internet, forever changing the 
way election campaigns are conducted.397 Claire Cain Miller points out that “by using 
interactive Web 2.0 tools, Mr. Obama’s campaign changed the way politicians organize 
supporters, advertise to voters, defend against attacks, and communicate with 
constituents.”398 In fact, Obama’s 2008 presidential campaign was exemplary in being 
used by terrorist organizations to design their own online campaigns.  
First, social media played a crucial role in helping Obama distribute his message 
to a broad audience, organize his party’s supporters throughout the nation, and raise 
unprecedented donations.399 The successful online campaign for Obama achieved the 
same goals that a terrorist group wants to achieve through its propaganda: to mobilize its 
supporters, recruit new members, and find funding. The Obama campaign managed to 
“mobilize supporters and organized communities, registering 1.5 million volunteers 
through myBarackObama.com and raising $600m from 3 million people. In addition, 
Obama’s campaign also built a consensual database of 3m mobile numbers.”400   
 
396 Jytte Klausen et al., “The YouTube Jihadists: A Social Network Analysis of Al-Muhajiroun’s 
Propaganda Campaign,” TRI, Perspectives on Terrorism 6, no. 1 (2012): 39, 
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/klausen-et-al-youtube-jihadists/html. 
397 Françoise Papa and Jean-Marc Francony, “The 2012 French Presidential Campaign: First Steps 
into the Political Twittersphere,” in The Routledge Companion to Social Media and Politics, 1st ed. (New 
York: Routledge, 2015), 364. 
398 Claire Cain Miller, “How Obama’s Internet Campaign Changed Politics,” The New York Times, 
Bits Blog (blog), November 7, 2008, https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/11/07/how-obamas-internet-
campaign-changed-politics/. 
399 Solop, “‘RT @BarackObama We Just Made History’: Twitter and the 2008 Presidential Election,” 
37. 
400 Jemina Kiss, “How Obama’s Online Campaign Helped Win Him the Presidency,” The Guardian, 
November 10, 2008, http://www.theguardian.com/media/2008/nov/10/obama-online-strategy. 
82 
Second, the Obama campaign illustrated that all sites and platforms that are up-to-
date and popular should be used. Thus, it is observed that Obama’s campaign staff used 
YouTube, MySpace, Flickr, Twitter, and Facebook to promote the candidate. Obama’s 
staff also quickly realized that through sophisticated videos, YouTube could become the 
barometer of public opinion.401 For this reason, they uploaded videos to the platform at a 
frantic pace.402 For instance, during the 2008 U.S. elections over 3,500 political videos 
were published on YouTube.403 While on Election Day, the barakobama.com site 
belonging to the winner of the election, Obama, had uploaded 1,821 videos on YouTube, 
while the opponent’s site, JohnMcCain.com, had posted only 330 videos.404 A 
comparison of these two numbers indicates YouTube played a significant role in 
Obama’s dominance.  
On Twitter, the 2008 election campaign was based on two patterns. First, 
Obama’s staff wanted to direct voters to targeted pages via a link posted on Twitter, 
especially on the Democratic party’s official website, where party representatives were 
waiting to persuade them to become volunteers, vote, or donate money. Through this 
pattern, the staff wanted to mobilize the voters and make them part of the party.405 The 
second pattern was the existence of a Twitter link that led voters to other official party 
platforms, such as YouTube or Facebook, trapping them in the party’s digital ecosystem 
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and thus making them its supporters.406 Both of these patterns were used by IS for its 
own spread in the media. In addition, the Democratic presidential campaign staff, in order 
to strengthen these two patterns, knew that they had to increase the number of party posts 
considerably. With this in mind, they created the Thunderclap application, which acted as 
an amplifier of Obama’s side posts, after tweeting and retweeting them.407 Inspired by 
this application, IS also created its own Twitter application, Dawn of Glad Tidings.408 
The effectiveness of these two patterns in the 2012 re-election campaign that Obama won 
is reflected in the number of followers that each of the candidates had. Obama had 22 
million followers, while the losing candidate, Mitt Romney, had 1.8 million followers.409 
Respectively, if the IS presence on Twitter is compared to that of Al-Nusra, in February 
2017, despite the mass downloading and blocking of IS and its followers’ accounts, the 
IS hashtag was reported 12,000 times a day, while the hashtag of al-Nusra ranged 
between 2,500 and 5,000 per day.410 
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A. CONCLUSIONS   
This thesis has explored aspects of the Islamic State’s media strategy not 
sufficiently covered by existing research. Specifically, this analysis found that the IS 
exploited the social media landscape to deliver costly signals that advanced its strategies 
of outbidding, intimidation, and polarization. The IS exploited available social media 
platforms to intimidate resistant forces within Iraq and Syria as well as Western countries 
it wanted to stay out of the area of action of the Islamic State. The IS also portrayed itself 
through social media as either violent or caring to outbid rival terrorist groups. Finally, by 
publicizing its extremist acts against certain groups of people, the IS sought to polarize 
Sunnis and Shiites within its territory or Muslims and non-Muslims outside its territory. 
The IS did not use extreme messages in propaganda for no reason; on the 
contrary, its use of Internet-based messaging was purposeful and strategic. And it is 
important for scholars and authorities to understand that there is a strategic logic behind 
its publicity campaign. First, such an understanding can enable the security authorities to 
design and implement effective counterstrategies. When Dabiq was first promoting IS’s 
outbidding strategy, Western nations should have immediately launched an anti-
propaganda campaign to deconstruct all the IS-promoted narratives to dominate the other 
terrorist groups and al Qaeda.411 Moreover, if the anti-IS coalition had realized in time 
the change in the group’s strategy from outbidding to intimidation, as evidenced by the 
move from Dabiq to Rumiyah, they might have better planned how to deal with the group 
beyond the web. A strategy of intimidation would be better dealt with by ground forces, 
for example, than by aerial bombardment.412 A more immediate and effective response 
to the group’s stated goals and plans might have meant the final defeat of the IS rather 
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than merely the loss of some areas and  a return to its roots, enabling continued 
insurgency operations that gave it an advantage and a new breath of life.413 
Second, recognizing that the IS uses its propaganda as a signal, the authorities 
should study jihadist activities in an attempt to find out what strategy the propaganda 
wants to advance, and consequently, what the group’s ultimate goals are. Authorities can 
devise countermeasures if they know what a terrorist group is seeking, and it is also 
easier for them to anticipate future actions by terrorists and be better prepared to prevent 
or mitigate them. The IS and its predecessors show consistency in the goals they have 
stated and in the strategies they follow. The IS leadership took the group from where 
Zarqawi and later AQI and ISI leaders had brought it and made it the most successful 
jihadi terrorist group in modern history.414 
On the other hand, there are two caveats related to the assessment of the IS media 
campaign in this thesis. First, the study of how effective the signaling campaign was in 
supporting IS strategies highlights that there are no clear boundaries between strategies. 
A atrocity that will act as a signal, precisely because of its extreme nature, can generate 
multiple messages that advance more than one strategy. The media, which act as 
multipliers, have a profound effect on this phenomenon. So the message from an extreme 
act can be made to appeal both for various target audiences and for longer periods. In 
particular, a terrorist attack in a city in the West can act directly as a strategy of 
intimidation in the near term while simultaneously as a foundation on which to stoke the 
polarization among the population over time. 
The second caveat concerns the limitations of scholars in analyzing jihadist 
propaganda in order to draw various conclusions. Initially, most studies, like this one, 
deal with IS material written in English. This is a major drawback in trying to pinpoint IS 
propaganda’s exact message and what strategy it ultimately supports. Moreover, because 
many experts on this topic agree that the group’s main goal was to establish a Caliphate, 
 
413 Haroro J. Ingram and Craig Whiteside, “In Search of the Virtual Caliphate: Convenient Fallacy, 
Dangerous Distraction,” War on the Rocks, September 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/09/in-search-
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it is understood that the local propaganda texts written in Arabic have many vital 
elements to study and analyze. In tandem with the limitations posed by language in the 
analysis of IS propaganda is the process of collecting and editing texts. Due to the 
plethora of texts available on the Internet and all the posts that have been uploaded by the 
IS and its followers on social media platforms, scholars and authorities have made a 
corpus of online jihadist texts through the use of keywords. This practice results in a large 
amount of propaganda material escaping analysis, either because of the different 
language in which it is written or because it has a different format such as image, video, 
or audio material that does not support keyword search engines.415  
Apart from the IS strategies, this thesis demonstrates the ways IS took advantage 
of the dynamics and technological possibilities of the Internet, and especially social 
media platforms and applications. First, the IS developed some patterns to exploit the 
social media landscape. The IS used these patterns depending on the desired result and to 
circumvent restrictions imposed by social media platforms. Second, the IS used tried and 
tested models to design its social media campaign to advance its strategies. For example, 
the group’s exploitation of Twitter was like that of major U.S. political parties during the 
2008 and 2012 presidential elections.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS  
Ultimately, this analysis of how the IS exploited the Internet concludes that the 
elimination of the group’s presence from the Internet is impossible.416 The group has so 
far shown that it finds ways to bypass security protocols, even on the most powerful 
platforms like Facebook.417 According to the author of this thesis, the authorities should 
find ways to restrict the group as much as possible. To aid authorities in that endeavor, 
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following are some recommendations based on the data that emerged during the research 
to write this thesis. 
The “beacon” pattern used by the IS, and which it seems to continue to follow,418 
can be likened to a “whack-a-mole” game.419 That is, after the group displays its 
inflammatory propaganda material on a social media platform, the authorities must 
discover and delete it. Consequently, the authorities’ main effort is to strike as fast as 
possible before the material gains traction, becomes more robust, and functions as a 
“beacon,” or in more popular terms, “before it goes viral,” attracting the attention of its 
ubiquitous supporters and social media users. This thesis suggests several preventative 
measures: 
(1) There must be a common framework of operation between the platforms 
and the authorities to exclude terrorist material immediately before it goes viral. To take a 
case in point, the EU enacted legislation pushing social media platforms such as 
Facebook and Twitter to remove terrorism content from their sites within one hour of 
posting.420 Failure to comply with this legislation will result in the platforms facing fines 
of many millions of euros.421 Furthermore, by preventing material released by terrorist 
organizations from going viral, the authorities are also preventing some terrorists, like 
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“Jihadi John,” from becoming role models422 and inspiring new terrorists.423 
Additionally, cooperation among social media platforms is vital to the development of a 
crisis response protocol to handle potential terrorist content online following a terrorist 
attack.  
(2) Governments should press the larger social media platforms and 
organizations to deal with terrorists via established mechanisms, such as the Global 
Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT),424 to support smaller tech companies that 
may not have the resources to tackle the spread of terrorist material on their platforms.425 
(3) To make the most of new policies and emerging technologies, the Western 
authorities must staff all its services with the most qualified personnel: professionals who 
can understand the new and emerging technologies as well as the function, content, and 
nature of social media. To assist the cyber domain, authorities should use religious 
authorities, scholars, and Muslims within communities to create effective anti-
propaganda against the Islamic State.426 For example, the British military is “recruiting 
philosophers, psychologists, and theologians to research new methods of psychological 
warfare and behavioral manipulation.”427  
(4) Governments must work with social media platforms to apply 
international legal frameworks, such as the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime,428 for 
cross-border access to electronic evidence. Since legislation varies from country to 
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country and different international legal instruments may be applicable, this policy will 
slow the spread of terrorist material online.429  
(5) Cooperative efforts are needed to silence or curb the jihadists’ means for 
spreading propaganda electronically. The law enforcement agencies of the EU Member 
States, Canada, and the United States have formed an alliance designed to curb IS action. 
The policy they adopted, in addition to ground operations, also had pro-active cyber 
operations against the group’s online capabilities. On April 25, 2018, they launched a 
joint action against the Amaq News Agency, al-Bayan radio, Halumu, and Nashir News, 
which are the main components of IS’ propaganda machine, with the aim of disrupting 
their online infrastructure.430 Another Western operation, known as # Op-ice-ISIS, 
succeeded in paralyzing several IS-related information dissemination channels.431 
(6) Finally, a feature of the IS members is that they were ‘early adopters,’ 
meaning they had the urge to use every innovation on the Internet immediately.432 The 
design of new policies and laws should take into account the features of new and 
emerging technologies in order to devise an effective strategy to prevent further abuse.433 
(7) One of the most drastic steps to fight terrorism is cutting the financing of 
terrorism.434 Western states should support new projects, such as BeCaNet, whose 
primary objective is to combat the online financing of terrorist organizations. To make 
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these projects more effective, it is necessary to strengthen public-private partnerships and 
improve the analysis of big data.435 
The last recommendation relates to Special Operations and concerns the 
decapitation of the Islamic State as a counterterrorism policy. This policy has many 
advantages. First, the loss of leadership can bring a terrorist group to its end.436 Second, 
the elimination of the leaders of terrorist organizations is a moment of retribution for the 
states that suffer from them.437 Third, publicizing successful operations against terrorist 
groups strengthens citizens’ sense of security.438 Finally, in the long run, the removal of 
the leaders or key members of a terrorist organization or network also has other 
significant benefits for the state that effects their removal from power. The killing of 
skilled terrorists such as trainers, bomb makers, trainers, recruiters, and leaders, who are 
both scarce in number and require a long time to perfect their skills, is a severe blow to 
the organization. The substitute for the losses will require time to train new terrorists, so 
the organization will be inactive for that time.439  
The U.S. and the anti-IS coalition chose the decapitation counterterrorism policy, 
that relied mainly on drone attacks or airstrikes. In this way they killed Abu Muhammad 
al Adnani al-Shami,440 ISIS deputy Abu Alaa al-Afri,441 and top Daesh commander 
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Omar Al-Shishani.442 This tactic of the Western allies achieved some of the advantages 
mentioned previously, but for a group, such as the IS, in which decentralization is one of 
its key components this approach did not bring the desired results. First, the killing of 
some IS leaders was a severe blow to the group, but not enough to eliminate it. On the 
contrary, having a decentralized administration, the group quickly promoted other people 
to key positions in the group. Moreover, the group used these attacks to fuel their 
propaganda by making the victims “heroes” of the war against the infidel Westerners and 
the cowardly way in which they killed these “heroes.”443 Second, the killing of IS leaders 
by bombing destroyed evidence such as laptops, sticks, mobile phones. For a group that 
has set up a chaotic decentralized system both on the Internet and on the ground 
worldwide, evidence collection is vital to uncovering its structure and reach. Perhaps 
studying this evidence is the only way to dismantle IS networks, helping authorities to 
follow Ariadne’s Thread through the labyrinth of the “virtual” and real Islamic State. For 
example, Special Operations Group raids in Iraq against ISI leaders have resulted in the 
deaths of those leaders and the gathering of vital information about the group. Utilization 
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APPENDIX A. ANALYSIS OF DABIQ COVERS 
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APPENDIX C. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF DABIQ AND 
RUMIYAH COVERS 
Table 3. Numerical Overview of Dabiq Magazine. 
Dabiq Magazine: 15 Issues 
IS Strategy 
Main image of the 
cover 
Main cover line or anchorage 
text Remarks 
Total % Total % 
Intimidation (I) 3 14% 3 13%  
Outbidding (O) 11 50% 12 52%  
Polarization 
(P) 
8 36% 8 35%  
Notes: In eight covers both the main image and the main cover line were given a pair of codes. 
Table 4. Numerical Overview of Rumiyah Magazine. 
Notes: 1) The issues #1−#6 did not have a main cover line or anchorage text. 
2) In three covers both the main image and the main cover line were given a pair of codes.  
 
  
Rumiyah Magazine: 13 Issues 
IS Strategy 
Main image of the 
cover 
Main cover line or anchorage 
text Remarks 
Total % Total % 
Intimidation (I) 10 62% 5 46%  
Outbidding (O) 4 25% 4 36%  
Polarization (P) 2 13% 2 18%  
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Figure 1. Strategies Reflected by the Main Image of the Dabiq Covers. 
 













Figure 3. Comparative Analysis of the Strategies Reflected by the Main Image 
of the Dabiq and Rumiyah Covers. 
 
Figure 4. Strategies Reflected by the Main Cover Line or Anchorage 





Figure 5. Strategies Reflected by the Main Cover Line or Anchorage 
Text of Rumiyah magazines. 
 
Note: The issues #1–#6 were without a main cover line. 
Figure 6. Comparative Analysis of the Strategies Reflected by the Main 
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